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8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	DISTRICT OF ARIZONA	
10	Jie Xia, a married woman; Necy Sundquist,	Case No. 2:23-cv-02086-GMS
11	a married woman; Mary Grace Abon, a	
12	married woman; Susan Samons, a married woman; Mariah Henry, a married woman,	MOTION TO DISMISS
13	Plaintiffs,	
14	V.	
15	Harrah's Arizona Corporation, a Nevada,	
16	Defendant.	
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18	I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>	
19	Defendant Harrah's Arizona Corporation ("Harrah's") formerly employed Plaintiffs	
20	as table games dealers at the Harrah's Ak-Chin Casino Resort in Maricopa, Arizona (the	
21	"Casino"). Harrah's sole purpose is to manage the Casino for and on behalf of the Ak-Chin	
22	Indian Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe (the "Community"). The doctrine of	
23	tribal sovereign immunity not only exempts Indian tribes such as the Community from suit	
24	but extends to entities who, like Harrah's, are considered arms of the tribe acting for the	
25	tribe. The Court must dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint against Harrah's under Rule 12(b)(1)	
26	because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the doctrine of tribal	
27	sovereign immunity.	

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Factual Allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint

Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against Harrah's asserting race, gender, ethnicity, and national origin discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) *et seq.* ("Title VII"), race discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"), and wrongful termination claims under the Arizona Employment Protection Act, A.R.S. § 23-1501 (the "EPA"). Plaintiffs are all non-white women who worked for Harrah's as "table games dealers" at the Casino. (Doc. 1¶12.)

The Complaint alleges that Harrah's determined that several gamblers were cheating at a casino game it called "Roll to Win." (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 36-45.) At least 13, and as many as 19, dealers were identified as having dealt Roll to Win when the cheating occurred. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 46.) The Ak-Chin Tribal Gaming Agency (the "TGA") "initiated proceedings to revoke Plaintiffs' gaming licenses" and Harrah's suspended them. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 49.) Harrah's ultimately terminated all five Plaintiffs. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 66.) Plaintiffs contend that similarly situated employees who are male, white, native English-speaking, and born in the United States and who engaged in "substantially similar alleged" policy violations were treated more favorably than them in that they were not terminated for a first offense. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 77-80.)

B. <u>Harrah's Manages the Casino for the Community Under its Supervision</u>

The Community is a federally recognized Indian tribe organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. (Mike Kintner's Declaration, attached as Exhibit A, \P 4.) It possesses sovereign governmental powers over the land where the Casino is located and operates the Casino for the benefit of the Community, to improve the economic conditions of its members, to enable it to serve the social, economic, educational, and health needs of the Community, to increase Community revenues, and to enhance the Community's economic self-sufficiency and self-determination. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A \P 5.)

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Harrah's and the Community are parties to a Management Agreement whereby Harrah's lends its technical expertise to the Community and manages the Casino for and on behalf of the Community. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A \P 6.) Harrah's sole purpose is to manage the Casino. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 7.) It does not engage in managing any other casino or engage in any other business. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A \P 7.)

Although Harrah's employs and pays employees, it is acting for the Community in doing so and the only business Harrah's conducts is managing the Casino for the Community. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 8.) The Community Council, which is a body the Community created in accordance with its articles of association to, among other things, oversee Harrah's, approves Harrah's Employee Handbook. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A \P 9.) The Community requires Harrah's to have certain policies and procedures, including grievance procedures, that apply to Harrah's employees and whenever Harrah's wants to change an employment policy it must give the Community Council written notice of any proposed changes or additions to its employment policies. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 10-11.) The Community Council has ten days to object to any change in employment policies. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 12.)

Community Inspectors, who are Community employees reporting directly to the Community Council, have the right to immediate access to the Casino, to inspect all aspects of the Casino's operation, without notice to Harrah's, to investigate problems relating to any aspect of the Casino's operations, and to perform any other tasks as assigned by the Community Council. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 13.) The Community also imposes limits on whom Harrah may employ, i.e., it may not employ any individual whose prior criminal record, reputation, habits, or associations are known to pose a threat to the public interest or to create or enhance the dangers of unfair or illegal gaming practices. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 14.)

To maximize the Casino's benefits to the Community, the Community requires Harrah's to give preference to qualified members of the Community, their spouses, and their children in recruiting, training, and hiring. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 15.) Harrah's must

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III. LAW AND ARGUMENT

> **Applicable Legal Standards for Harrah's Motion to Dismiss** Α.

Harrah's moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, which is a quasijurisdictional defense in that it "may be forfeited where the [sovereign] fails to assert it and therefore may be viewed as an affirmative defense." Arizona v. Bliemeister (In re Bliemeister), 296 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2002). "Although sovereign immunity is only quasi-jurisdictional in nature, Rule 12(b)(1) is still a proper vehicle for invoking sovereign

(Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 16.) Harrah's is also required to submit an annual budget and plan to the Community for approval. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 17.)

The Tribal Gaming Agency ("TGA") is the onsite regulator at the Casino. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 18.) The TGA ensures compliance with federal and state law to protect the Community's assets. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 18.) Among its oversight functions, the TGA regulates and controls the gaming licenses of Harrah's employees. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 19.) If the TGA suspends or revokes an employee's gaming license, that employee can no longer work at the Casino. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 19.) Harrah's suspended each of the Plaintiffs here because the TGA first suspended their gaming licenses. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 20.) At that point, Harrah's had no choice but to suspend Plaintiffs along with the other employees who had their gaming license suspended by the TGA. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 21.)

The Community pays all expenses, which include any attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, settlements, and/or judgments, from lawsuits against Harrah's. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 22.) Harrah's must inform the Community of any lawsuits or claims being asserted against Harrah's or the Community and the Community has the right to defend or settle any legal claim against Harrah's regarding the operation of the Casino. (Kintner Decl. Ex. A ¶ 23.)

immunity from suit." *Pistor v. Garcia*, 791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) (footnote omitted). Thus, when a defendant timely and successfully invokes tribal sovereign immunity, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Arizona v. Tohono O'odham Nation*, 818 F.3d 549, 562–63 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that when tribal sovereign immunity applied, "the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction"); *Pistor*, 791 F.3d at 1111 ("[A]s the tribal defendants invoked sovereign immunity in an appropriate manner and at an appropriate stage, *i.e.* in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, if they were entitled to tribal immunity from suit, the district court would lack jurisdiction over the claims against them and would be required to dismiss them from the litigation.").

In the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss based on tribal sovereign immunity, "the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving its existence," *i.e.*, that immunity does not bar the suit. *Robinson v. United States*, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir.2009). When a district court is presented with a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction, "[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to [a] plaintiff's allegations." *Id.* at 685 (*quoting Augustine v. United States*, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1983)). In resolving such a motion, "[a] district court may 'hear evidence regarding jurisdiction' and 'resolv[e] factual disputes where necessary." *Id.* at 685 (*quoting Augustine*, 704 F.2d at 1077.).

B. The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereign Immunity

Congress has expressly exempted Indian tribes from the definition of "employers" under Title VII. *Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc.*,157 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998) (*quoting* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). The purpose of this "tribal exemption, like the purpose of sovereign immunity itself, [is] to promote the ability of Indian tribes to control their own enterprises." *Id.* (*citing Dille v. Council of Energy Res. Tribes*, 801 F.2d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1986)).

"Indian tribes are 'domestic dependent nations' that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories." *Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma*, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). Thus, aside from the

specific Title VII exemption that tribes enjoy, it is well-established that Indian tribes are immune from suit absent congressional authorization or clear waiver. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 789 (2014); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Federal courts have applied sovereign immunity to bar civil rights and tort claims against Indian tribes in a variety of contexts. See e.g., NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1159 & n. 9 (9th Cir. 2002); Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's dismissal of § 1983 action due to sovereign immunity against Blackfeet Tribe and the individual police officers "for want of jurisdiction."); Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2nd Cir. 2004) (federally-recognized Indian tribes are immune from suit under the Family Medical Leave Act brought by employee of casino operated by Indian tribe).

Tribal sovereign immunity applies to the tribe's commercial as well as its governmental activities. *Miller v. Wright*, 705 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In addition, and significantly for the purposes of this Motion, the settled law in the Ninth Circuit is that "[t]ribal sovereign immunity not only protects tribes themselves, but also extends to arms of the tribe acting on behalf of the tribe." *White v. Univ. of California*, 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

C. Harrah's is Entitled to Tribal Immunity as an Arm of the Community

In determining whether an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit has explained that "[t]he question is not whether the activity [at issue] may be characterized as a business . . . but whether the entity [claiming immunity] acts as an arm of the tribe so that its activities are properly deemed to be those of the tribe." *Allen v. Gold Country Casino*, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff in *Allen* brought wrongful termination and retaliation claims against his former employer, Gold Country Casino, and the federally recognized Indian tribe that owned and operated the casino. The district court dismissed the claims against the defendants on the ground of sovereign immunity. On appeal, the plaintiff conceded the tribe's immunity, "but argued that the district court erred

in extending that immunity to the Casino without scrutinizing the relationship between the Tribe and the Casino." *Id.* at 1045.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal against the casino finding that "the record and the law establish sufficiently that it functions as an arm of the Tribe." *Id.* In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that the tribe owned and operated the casino, which was "no ordinary business." *Id.* at 1046. Specifically, the casino was "not a mere revenue-producing tribal business" but was created under a compact with the State of California to "enable the Tribe to develop self-sufficiency, promote tribal economic development, and generate jobs and revenues to support the Tribe's government and governmental services and programs." *Id.* at 1046-47. Given that the Tribe owned and operated the casino, the *Allen* Court observed that the "economic and other advantages [of the casino] inure[d] to the benefit of the Tribe" and the casino's immunity directly protected "the sovereign Tribe's treasury, which is one of the historic purposes of sovereign immunity in general." *Id.* at 1047 (citation omitted). Consequently, given "the purposes for which the Tribe founded this Casino and the Tribe's ownership and control of its operations," the court held that "there can be little doubt that the Casino functions as an arm of the Tribe" and, therefore, "enjoys the Tribe's immunity from suit." *Id.*

In assessing whether an entity is an "arm of the tribe" for the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit considers the "(1) the method of creation of the economic entities; (2) their purpose; (3) their structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of control the tribe has over the entities; (4) the tribe's intent with respect to the sharing of its sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and the entities." *White*, 765 F.3d at 1025. Based on these factors, and applying the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Allen*, the Court must find that Harrah's functions as an arm of the Community in managing the Casino for the Community's benefit.

The Community owns the land where the Casino is located and operates the Casino for the benefit of the Community, to improve the economic conditions of its members, to enable it to serve the social, economic, educational, and health needs of the Community, to

increase Community revenues, and to enhance the Community's economic self-sufficiency and self-determination. The Community pays all expenses associated with lawsuits against Harrah's, including attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, settlements, and judgments. Indeed, the Community retains the legal right to defend or settle any lawsuit against Harrah's regarding the operation of the Casino. Thus, just as in *Allen*, the economic benefits of the Casino inure to the Community and Harrah's immunity would directly protect the Community's treasury, which is one of the historic purposes of sovereign immunity. *Allen*, 464 F.3d at 1047.

The factors outlined in *White* also support applying the Community's tribal sovereign immunity to Harrah's. Although Harrah's was not created by the Community, its sole purpose is to manage the Casino for and on the Community's behalf. As descried in Mike Kintner's Declaration, the Community, the Community Council, and the TGA exercise a high level of control over Harrah's budget, employment policies, and the employees it hires. Community Inspectors have the right to immediate access to the Casino at any time, to inspect all aspects of the Casino's operation, without notice to Harrah's, to investigate problems relating to any aspect of the Casino's operations, and to perform any other tasks as assigned by the Community Council. The TGA regulates and controls the gaming licenses of all Harrah's employees and has the authority to revoke those licenses, which would prohibit Harrah's from continue to employ those employees. Finally, the Community is financially responsible for defending this lawsuit and paying any settlement or judgment.

Given Harrah's purpose, the degree of control the Community has over Harrah's, and the financial relationship between the Community and Harrah's, this Court must find that, in managing the Casino, Harrah's is acting as an arm of the Community and is entitled to share in its immunity from suit. *See Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort*, 629 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying the Ninth Circuit factors and concluding that the Casino defendant had "a sufficiently close relationship to the Tribe to share in its immunity.")

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IV. CONCLUSION

Harrah's sole purpose and only business is to manage the Casino on the Community's behalf. The Community has the right to exercise control over Harrah's budget, employment policies, management, and the employees it can hire and promote. The TGA oversees and controls the gaming licenses of Harrah's employees. The Community financially benefits from the Casino and is financially responsible for any lawsuits against Harrah's, including this one. Consequently, the Court must grant Harrah's Motion and dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against it because in managing the Casino for the Community it acts as an arm of the Community and is entitled to share in its tribal sovereign immunity.

DATED this 20th day of December, 2023.

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/s/ Peter C. Prynkiewicz

Peter C. Prynkiewicz LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. Attorney for Defendant Harrah's Arizona Corporation

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I hereby certify that I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants, and mailed a copy of same to the following if non-registrants, this 20th day of December, 2023, to: John Dean Curtis, II Aaron M. Duell BURCH & CRACCHIOLO, P.A. 1850 North Central Avenue, Ste. 1700 Phoenix, AZ 85004 Attorneys for Plaintiffs /s/ Tisha A. Davis 4856-2761-2054.1 / 083558-1272

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