JASON M. FRIERSON 1 United States Attorney District of Nevada Nevada Bar Number 7709 3 SKYLER H. PEARSON Assistant United States Attorney 501 Las Vegas Blvd. So., Suite 1100 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 388-6336 skyler.pearson@usdoj.gov 6 7 Attorneys for the United States 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA** 10 Doreen Brown, Louella Stanton, Eldon Case No. 3:21-cv-00344-MMD-CLB Brown, Dwight Brown, Elena Loya, Elisa 11 Dick, Lovelle Brown, Kevin Dick, & Leslie 12 Smartt Jr., Plaintiffs, 13 **Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment** v. 14 15 Deb Haaland, Secretary, United States Department of the Interior, in her official 16 capacity; Bryan Newland, United States Department of Interior, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, in his official capacity; Darryl 17 LaCounte, Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in his official capacity; Rachael 18 Larson, Superintendent of the Western 19 Nevada Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs, in her official capacity; and the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian 20 Affairs. 21 Defendants. 22 23 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Defendants, Deb Haaland, Secretary, United States 24 2.5 Department of the Interior, in her official capacity; Bryan Newland, United States Department of Interior, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, in his official capacity; Darryl 26 Lacounte, Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in his official capacity; Rachel Larson, 27 Superintendent of the Western Region, Bureau of Indian Affairs, in her official capacity; 28

and the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs ("Defendants"), move for summary judgment against Plaintiffs, Doreen Brown, Louella Stanton, Eldon Brown, Dwight Brown, Elena Loya, Elisa Dick, Lovelle Brown, Kevin Dick, & Leslie Smartt Jr., ("Plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs fail to establish a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") or the Accardi doctrine. Accordingly, the Court should enter judgment in favor of Defendants. This motion is based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, as well as all papers and pleadings on file. Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 2023. JASON M. FRIERSON United States Attorney /s/ Skyler H. Pearson SKYLER H. PEARSON Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for the United States 

#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### I. Introduction

The Court should grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs fail to establish the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact that Defendants' decision, or indecision, to not reassume the Judicial Services P.L. 93-638 contract ("638 contract") with the Winnemucca Indian Colony ("WIC" or "Tribe") amounted to an arbitrary and capricious decision or an abuse of discretion in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") or the *Accardi* doctrine. Plaintiffs cannot establish any specific trust or fiduciary obligations owed by Defendants to Plaintiffs, much less establish any violation of such obligations. The Administrative Record ("AR") shows that Defendants thoroughly investigated issues with the 638 contract, including those raised by Plaintiffs and then made a valid discretionary decision to protect tribal sovereignty on the Colony by not reassuming the judicial services contract under an emergency or non-emergency basis. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 100) should be denied and the Court should grant summary judgment for Defendants and dismiss this case.

#### II. Procedural Posture

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on August 6, 2021, alleging Defendant's transfer of certain court documents to the wrong court violated certain United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") regulations. *See* ECF No. 6. Thereafter, the parties agreed to stay the proceedings for 90 days (ECF No. 13). The Court granted the stay (ECF No. 14).

While the stay remained in place, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Order Pursuant to LR 7-4 (ECF No. 15). Plaintiffs' motion asked the Court to enjoin the BIA to enforce an order from the Court of Indian Appeals—a court without proper jurisdiction—to prevent the evictions of Plaintiffs from certain tribal lands and the demolition of their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The original complaint and first amended complaint named Deb Haaland, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior as the only defendant.

1 homes by the governing tribal council—the WIC. See ECF No. 15. The Court ordered 2 Defendant to respond and set the matter for expedited hearing (ECF No. 16). 3 Defendant responded, and the WIC moved to intervene and filed a response (ECF Nos. 17, 4 18, and 20). At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion, which the 5 Court construed as a motion for a temporary restraining order, after concluding that the 6 Court of Indian Appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue the order Plaintiffs sought to have 7 enforced by the BIA. See ECF No. 22 (Minute Order). 8 Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. See ECF No. 23 (Notice of Appeal). 9 Although the Ninth Circuit ordered expedited briefing, it soon thereafter summarily denied 10 Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. See ECF Nos. 24, 26. 11 After having failed to convince both this Court and the Ninth Circuit of its views, 12 Plaintiffs sought to remove the stay and amend their complaint. See ECF Nos. 28–29. The 13 Court lifted the stay and allowed for further briefing on the motion to amend (ECF Nos. 14 37–39). 15 Plaintiffs' first amended complaint sought injunctive relief for violations of the Indian 16 Self Determination and Education Assistance Act ("ISDEAA"), the Administrative 17 Procedures Act ("APA"), the Fifth Amendment, and a general fiduciary duty owed by the 18 United States to Plaintiffs. See ECF Nos. 29, 66. Both Defendant and the WIC moved to 19 dismiss (ECF Nos. 41; 47). The Court denied Intervenor WIC's motion but granted 20 Defendant's motion in part. See ECF No. 65. Specifically, the Court held that "Plaintiffs' 21 APA claims may proceed." (ECF No. 65 at 46). The Court "dismissed with prejudice," 22 Plaintiffs' ISDEAA claims "as amendment would be futile." (ECF No. 65 at 46). The Court 23 also dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment and 24 breach of fiduciary duty claims (ECF No. 65 at 46). 25 Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint—an 82-page document with 46 26 attached exhibits—on June 25, 2022 (ECF No. 66). The second amended complaint alleged 27 seven causes of action and sought declaratory and injunctive relief (ECF No. 66).

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint (ECF No. 74). The Court granted in part, and denied in part, Defendants' motion (ECF No. 97). Specifically, the Court dismissed parts of Plaintiffs' APA claims but allowed "the remaining parts of the APA claims to proceed." (ECF No. 97 at 2). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claims and Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment, due process claims (ECF No. 97). Further, the Court allowed Plaintiffs' *Accardi* claim to "proceed under the APA" (ECF No. 97 at 2).

After Defendants moved to dismiss and WIC answered Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 84). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin Defendants to monitor and/or reassume the judicial services contract entered into with the WIC, alleging that Plaintiffs "face imminent eviction and demolition of their homes within the next 30 days" (ECF No 84 at 3) at the hands of the WIC. Specifically, Plaintiffs asked the Court to require Defendants to "monitor and determine whether to reassume judicial services at WIC on an emergency basis pursuant to 25 C.F.R. Section 900.247 **before** any more evictions, demolitions or arrests for trespass occur against Plaintiffs." (ECF No. 84 at 28) (emphasis in original).

Following expedited briefing and a hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion (ECF No. 96). The Court specifically held that Plaintiffs "failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, that public interest favor[ed] an injunction, and [that Plaintiffs] failed to meet the high standard for mandatory preliminary injunctive relief" (ECF No. 96 at 1–2).

As for the likelihood of success on the merits, the Court determined that "Plaintiffs fail[ed] to show that compelling the BIA to 'monitor and determine whether to reassume judicial services' would provide any immediate relief or would immediately enjoin the WIC Tribal Court's order of eviction." (ECF No. 96 at 2) (citation omitted). The Court thus held that "Plaintiffs' requested relief is premised on mere speculation, and the connection between Plaintiffs' claims, their requested relief, and the imminent irreparable harm of

eviction [was] at best tenuous." (ECF No. 96 at 3) (citing *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009); *Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton*, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010)).

As for the public interest, the Court determined that Plaintiffs' requested relief "would be against the public interest and would infringe on tribal sovereignty" because the evidence showed that the "WIC Tribal Court [wa]s currently functioning and provide[d] a forum to adjudicate Plaintiffs' grievances[,]" and that Plaintiffs sought recourse in federal court only "because they [we]re dissatisfied with the Tribal Court's decisions" (ECF No. 96 at 3).

The case then proceeded as provided in the Court's Scheduling Order (ECF No. 83) with Defendants providing the parties with the AR and then filing it with the Court and the parties now moving for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 98; 100).

Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment (ECF No. 100). Plaintiffs seek a court order "requiring Defendants to investigate and reassume" the 638 contract for judicial services "under their trust and fiduciary duty, and to reassume the court services contract under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act ("ISDEAA"), and the statutory obligation of 25 U.S.C. § 5329 and 5330 as Plaintiffs' health, safety, and welfare were endangered by" the WIC, "causing irreparable harm." (ECF No. 100 at 2). Furthermore, "Plaintiffs also allege the Defendants violated the *Accardi Doctrine* by not following its own regulations, policies, and discrete procedures regarding reassumption determinations and the timeliness of those determinations when Plaintiffs' health and safety were at risk." (ECF No. 100 at 2).

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#### III. Statement of Undisputed Facts<sup>2</sup>

- 1. On June 1, 2021, the WIC and the BIA enter into a 638 contract. The 638 contract incorporated a settlement with a timeline for transition of jurisdiction of cases from the C.F.R. Court. AR020–057.
- 2. On July 12, 2021, Nevada Legal Services, the organization representing Plaintiffs in this action, sent a letter to BIA's Bryan Bowker on behalf of certain residents of the Colony. The letter challenged a transfer of jurisdiction of cases from the C.F.R. Court to the Tribal Court. AR191-215.
- 3. On August 6, 2021, Nevada Legal Services, on behalf of Plaintiffs, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada alleging that the BIA improperly transferred C.F.R. Court files to the Tribal Court instead of to the C.F.R. Appellate Court (ECF No. 6).
- 4. On October 20, 2021, the WIC adopted a housing ordinance allowing for, among other provisions, self-help evictions. AR255; *see also* AR254.
- 5. On November 2–3, 2021, the WIC, pursuant to its housing ordinance, began removal of property and persons that the WIC considered to be in trespass. *See* ECF No. 15.
- 6. On November 4, 2021, the BIA contacted the Tribal Court Judge to inquire into eviction cases transferred from the C.F.R. Court. AR182.
- 7. On November 4, 2021, Plaintiffs sought an emergency order from this Court to force BIA to enforce an order coming out of the C.F.R. Appeals Court (ECF No. 15).
- 8. On November 12, 2021, BIA sent a letter to the WIC regarding a monitoring visit AR169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In their motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 100), Plaintiffs improperly rely on two declarations. *See* Exhibits 1 and 2. These declarations are outside both the AR and the record before the Court. As such, the Court should disregard them. *See Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck*, 222 F.3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing that judicial review of a final agency action is generally limited to a review of the administrative record). And, although exceptions to this general rule apply, *see Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Serv.*, 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996), those exceptions are inapplicable in this case. *See id.* In any event, Plaintiffs fail to provide any reason why the Court should look beyond the AR in this case. *See* ECF No. 100.

1	9. On November 16, 2021, Nevada Legal Services, the same organization that
2	represents Plaintiffs in this matter, sent a second letter to Bryan Bowker of the BIA. AR170
3	10. On November 17, 2021, BIA again contacted the Tribal Court Judge to discuss the
4	status of the transferred eviction cases. AR166.
5	11. On November 23, 2021, the WIC initiated eviction case(s) against the alleged
6	trespassers in the WIC Tribal Court. See ECF No. 94-1 at 97.
7	12. On December 8, 2021, BIA held a meeting with the WIC to discuss the Tribal
8	Court program. AR152–154.
9	13. On December 10, 2021, BIA sent a letter to the Tribal Court Judge providing
10	technical assistance. AR082.
11	14. On December 14, 2021, BIA sent a letter to the WIC outlining areas of potential
12	concern with the Tribal Court program. AR254.
13	15. On December 15, 2021, the WIC responded to the BIA's letter regarding areas of
14	potential concern with the Tribal Courts program. AR243.
15	16. On January 20, 2022, the BIA sent another letter to the WIC regarding the Tribal
16	Court program. AR229.
17	17. On January 21, 2022, the WIC again responded to the second BIA letter regarding
18	the Tribal Courts program. AR235.
19	18. On January 27, 2022, the BIA held a teleconference with the WIC to discuss the
20	Tribal Courts program. AR080.
21	19. On July 25, 2022, the BIA held another meeting with the WIC regarding the Tribal
22	Court program. AR221.
23	20. On August 19, 2022, the BIA held an in-person visit with Tribal Court Judge. AR222.
24	21. On October 19, 2022, the BIA conducted a review meeting regarding Tribal Courts
25	program. AR313.
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#### IV. Summary Judgment Standard

The APA allows for judicial review of federal agency actions. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. In actions brought under the APA, the Court does not follow the traditional summary judgment analysis set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. That is because "there are no disputed facts that the district court must resolve." *Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS*, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985). Instead, the Court "determines whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did." *Id.* "Assuming that statutory procedures meet constitutional requirements, the court is limited to a determination of whether the agency substantially complied with its statutory and regulatory procedures, whether its factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and whether its action was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion." *Albert v. Chafee*, 571 F.2d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting *Toohey v. Nitze*, 429 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970)); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the agency's action is arbitrary and capricious. *See George* v. *Bay Area Rapid Transit*, 577 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio* v. *FAA*, 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). A Court must be "highly deferential" in an APA review case and must "presum[e] the agency action to be valid . . . ." *Nw. Ecosystem Alliance* v. *U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007).

#### V. Argument

The Court should grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs fail to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that Defendants' decision or indecision to not reassume the 638 contract on either an emergency or non-emergency basis amounted to an arbitrary and capricious decision or an abuse of discretion. In fact, the AR establishes that Defendants respected the WIC's tribal sovereignty while still investigating issues surrounding the judicial services contract. The Court should deny Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs fail to establish any specific trust duties as required by law, let alone establish a breach of such a duty. Furthermore, the

AR establishes that Defendants investigated Plaintiffs' claims in accordance with its rules and regulations. Plaintiffs may dislike Defendants' decision because it was not in their favor. However, such decision or indecision, whichever way Plaintiffs wish to characterize it, does not amount to an arbitrary and capricious determination or an abuse of discretion under the APA. Furthermore, Plaintiffs are unable to establish, within the AR or otherwise, that the alleged imminent harms (evictions and demolitions carried out by the WIC) were caused by or even facilitated by the Judicial Services 638 contract. Plaintiffs consequently are unable to establish how the action requested of BIA (reassumption of the Judicial Services program) would have prevented the WIC from effectuating the evictions and related actions. Accordingly, the Court should grant summary judgment for Defendants and dismiss this case.

#### A. Plaintiffs Fail to Establish Any Specific Trust Responsibility

Plaintiffs argue generally "that the Defendants breached their trust responsibility to Plaintiffs by failing to protect Plaintiffs' rights, safety, and welfare, and to preserve Plaintiffs' interest in the 20 acres of land on which they formerly resided" (ECF No. 100 at 3–4). Plaintiffs' arguments fail.

First, Plaintiffs fail to establish their generalized assertions by either fact or law. *See* ECF No. 100 (providing no record citation to the AR or any legal precedent to establish the existence of a specific fiduciary duty between Plaintiffs and Defendants). Second, the AR shows that Defendants entered into a 638 contract with the WIC, not Plaintiffs (AR020–057). And finally, although there is "a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people," that general trust relationship does not, by itself, create legally enforceable obligations for the United States. *United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation*, 564 U.S. 162, 173 (2011) (quoting *United States v. Mitchell*, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) ("*Mitchell III*")). The United States "assumes Indian trust responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute." *Id.* at 177. Even "a statute or regulation that recites a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian People is not enough to establish any

particular trust duty." *Hopi Tribe v. United States*, 782 F.3d 662, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs do not indicate which rights Defendants did not protect. Plaintiffs fail to explain how Defendants ignored Plaintiffs' safety and/or welfare. In fact, it seems that any issue Plaintiffs take in this section arise from the Tribe's decision to engage in self-help evictions and demolitions. Plaintiff can tie neither the decision to engage in self-help, nor the evictions or demolitions themselves to Defendants since these actions were taken by the Tribe. Plaintiffs additionally fail to establish their legal interest in tribal lands. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs cannot show the existence of any specific trust or fiduciary relationship between themselves and Defendants, or point the Court to how Defendants specifically breached that trust, the Court should grant summary judgment for Defendants. *See United States v. Navajo Nation*, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003) ("a Tribe must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed to faithfully perform those duties.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

# B. Defendants Investigated Plaintiffs' Claims and Discharged Their Statutory Obligations

The AR provides that after entering into the 638 contract with the WIC, Defendants continued to monitor the WIC's performance under it as required by statute and regulation. Defendants' monitoring efforts included: (1) contacting the WIC's Tribal Court Judge about eviction cases involving Plaintiffs transferred from the C.F.R. Court (AR166, AR182); (2) sending, receiving, and responding to letters to the WIC and Plaintiffs (AR191–215, AR169–70, AR082, AR254, AR243, AR229, AR235); (3) engaging in monitoring visits with the WIC (AR169, AR222); and (4) holding meetings with the WIC (AR080, AR152–54, AR221, AR313).

Overall, the AR establishes that Defendants were apprised of happenings at the Colony, knew of issues involving the WIC's performance of the judicial services contract—including those flagged by Plaintiffs, and respected the WIC's tribal sovereignty by working with it to help it discharge its duties under the contract. As such, no genuine issue as to any

material fact exists to show that Defendants failed to investigate what has happening on Colony lands or breach any statutory or regulatory duty. Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to establish that Defendants decision to not reassume the judicial services contract, under either an emergency or non-emergency basis amounts to an arbitrary and capricious decision or an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that the evictions conducted by the WIC constitute immediate and irreparable harm (ECF No. 100 at 10–12). However, Plaintiffs do not cite anything within the AR, or even outside the AR, that shows a direct connection between these alleged harms and the 638 contract. In other words, Plaintiffs cannot establish that the administration of the 638 contract caused or led to the alleged imminent and irreparable harms. Any connection between the two is at best tenuous and speculative. Requiring or expecting Defendants to reassume the 638 contract, a drastic measure, without a showing that the 638 contract itself is leading to factors listed in 25 C.F.R. § 900.247 would be unreasonable. Therefore, Defendants acted reasonably through their thorough and ongoing oversight over the program while respecting the sovereignty that is central to the spirit and mission of P.L. 93-638. See 25 U.S.C. § 5302. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted for Defendants.

#### VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons Plaintiffs' motion should be denied, the Court should grant summary judgment for Defendants and dismiss this case.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 2023.

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/s/ Skyler H. Pearson SKYLER H. PEARSON Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for the United States

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