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8
 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 11

12
 13 **ALTURAS INDIAN RANCHERIA, a**
federally recognized Indian tribe,
 14
 Plaintiff,
 15
 v.
 16
 17 **GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor of the State**
of California; and the STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
 18
 Defendants.
 19

2:22-cv-01486-KJM-DMC

**STATE DEFENDANTS' POINTS AND
 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Date: November 3, 2023
 Time: 10:00 a.m.
 Courtroom: 3, 15th Floor
 Judge: The Honorable Kimberly J.
 Mueller
 Trial Date: None Set
 Action Filed: 8/22/2022

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1 Defendants, Governor Gavin Newsom and the State of California (collectively, State),
2 submit the following points and authorities in support of the State’s summary judgment motion in
3 their favor and against the Plaintiff Alturas Indian Rancheria (Alturas or Tribe), a federally
4 recognized Indian tribe.

5 INTRODUCTION

6 Alturas’s Complaint alleges that the State violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
7 (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2712, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1167. Specifically, Alturas alleges that
8 during tribal-state class III gaming compact negotiations the State conducted “surface” or “sham”
9 bargaining and demanded that the Tribe agree to include terms in a new compact that were
10 beyond IGRA’s permissible scope. Based on these allegations, the Tribe claims the State failed
11 to negotiate in good faith under IGRA.

12 The record in this case demonstrates that the parties were only beginning to discuss
13 compact provisions and the process of negotiation was still in the early stages when Alturas
14 prematurely commenced this litigation. Contrary to the Tribe’s allegations in its Complaint, the
15 Joint Record of Negotiation (JRON) and the Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (JSUF) show
16 that throughout the parties’ limited compact negotiations the State actively negotiated, proposed
17 and modified terms in response to negotiated issues, remained willing to continue meeting and
18 negotiating with Alturas, and acted in good faith. *See Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of*
19 *the Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. Cal.*, 973 F. 3d 953, 965 (9th Cir. 2020) (*Pauma II*) (holding
20 that the State negotiated in good faith under IGRA when it agreed to negotiate, actively engaged
21 in negotiations and remained willing to continue negotiations when litigation was filed).
22 Specifically, this record demonstrates that the State is entitled to summary judgment for two
23 reasons.

24 First, the State negotiated in good faith because it agreed to negotiate a new compact and
25 sought to advance negotiations forward but never demanded that a final compact include
26 provisions that were unlawful. The record shows the State’s good faith negotiations. The State
27 provided sample compacts for the Tribe’s consideration, promptly offered and scheduled compact
28 negotiation meetings, indicated a willingness to continue additional negotiations seeking compact

1 compromises, and offered substantial revisions to its proposed compact terms in response to
2 newly issued Ninth Circuit precedent.

3 Second, Alturas's responses to the State's ongoing negotiation efforts further demonstrate
4 that the State negotiated in good faith. Specifically, the Tribe engaged in delays totaling
5 seventeen months out of a total of approximately twenty-three months of negotiations.
6 Ultimately, Alturas returned to negotiations only to walk away again even though the State was
7 willing to revisit key provisions at issue based on newly issued case law. Alturas now demands
8 this Court insert itself into the incomplete negotiations Alturas caused. Under this record, the
9 State did not violate its duty to negotiate in good faith under IGRA.

10 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

11 I. ALTURAS'S EXISTING 1999 COMPACT AND THE TRIBE'S REQUEST FOR NEW 12 NEGOTIATIONS

13 Alturas operates a class III gaming facility under IGRA pursuant to a tribal-state gaming
14 compact with the State. This original compact was executed in October 1999 (1999 Compact).
15 The 1999 Compact provided for a termination date of December 31, 2020, with an automatic
16 extension to June 30, 2022, if the parties had not agreed to an extension or entered into a new
17 compact by December 31, 2020. JRON Tab 70 at 1090, JRON Tab 57 at 973-974.¹

18 In a letter by Phillip Del Rosa, Chairman of Alturas, dated May 7, 2020, the Tribe requested
19 a meeting with the State to discuss a tribal-state compact. JRON Tab 1 at 2. The State responded
20 in a letter dated October 5, 2020, apologizing that a mail sorting error had occurred causing delay
21 in responding to the Tribe's request. JRON Tab 2 at 4. The letter advised that the State was
22 willing to meet with the Tribe regarding a new tribal-state class III gaming compact as soon as
23 possible. *Id.* The letter provided available meeting dates in late October. *Id.*

24 On October 27, 2020, representatives from the State and Alturas participated in a phone call
25 to discuss holding compact negotiations, and on October 28, 2020, as requested by the Tribe, the
26 State emailed Alturas copies of the tribal-state gaming compacts between the State and the Hoopa

27 ¹ All references to the JRON cite to the Bates-stamped documents contained in the six
28 volume Joint Record of Negotiations filed by the parties on July 7, 2023. ECF No. 45-1 through
45-6.

1 Valley Tribe (JRON Tabs 13-14 at 44-193) and the State and the Yurok Tribe (JRON 15 at 195-
2 282) as examples the parties could work from. Also, on October 28, 2020, the State advised the
3 Tribe that it welcomed scheduling a compact negotiation meeting and requested available dates
4 from tribal representatives. JRON Tab 13 at 44.

5 After ten months of failing to receive a response from Alturas, on August 31, 2021, the
6 State followed up with a letter that again offered to schedule a compact negotiation meeting.
7 JRON Tabs 16-17 at 284-287. The State further notified Alturas that the 1999 Compact had been
8 automatically extended to June 30, 2022, but that this left limited time to negotiate a new
9 compact. *Id.* at 286. The State indicated that a new Tribal Negotiations Advisor, Nathan
10 Voegeli, had been appointed. Mr. Voegeli stressed that the State was committed to working
11 diligently with the Tribe to see that a new compact was in place before the current compact
12 expired, and encouraged Alturas to schedule a tribal-state compact negotiating meeting. *Id.* at
13 286-287.

14 Almost two months later, on October 22, 2021, Alturas belatedly responded to the State
15 advising that it would like to schedule a meeting with the State to “discuss a compact to replace
16 the 1999 compact.” JRON Tab 19 at 291. Following several email exchanges (JRON Tabs 21-25
17 at 295-308), representatives for the State and Alturas agreed upon a videoconference compact
18 negotiation session for November 19, 2021. In an email dated October 27, 2021, the State
19 explained that it wished to discuss the timing for achieving the necessary approvals for a new
20 compact to ensure review and ratification before the Tribe’s current compact expired on June 30,
21 2022. *Id.* at 295. The State explained that a new class III gaming compact required review and
22 ratification by the California Legislature and a 45-day review by the U.S. Department of the
23 Interior. *Id.* Based on the required approvals, the goal was to have a signed compact to the
24 California Legislature in January 2022. *Id.* In order to meet this goal, the State suggested the
25 parties work from a previously approved compact and make adjustments based on the Tribe’s
26 own circumstances. *Id.* The State reiterated that it had previously provided Alturas with
27 compacts that the State had entered into with the Yurok Tribe and Hoopa Valley Tribe. *Id.* The
28 State expressed its desire to know if the Tribe preferred to work from one of those compacts or

1 perhaps another recently ratified compact such as the one the State had entered into with
2 Middletown Rancheria. *Id.* In particular, the State advised that it was critical for the State to
3 learn the Tribe's preferred economic terms and approach regarding an environmental review
4 process. *Id.*

5 **II. THE PARTIES CONDUCT TWO COMPACT NEGOTIATION MEETINGS IN NOVEMBER**
6 **AND DECEMBER, 2021, AND EXTEND THE TRIBE'S 1999 COMPACT**

7 On November 19, 2021, the State and the Tribe held their first negotiation meeting via
8 videoconference.² JRON Tab 25 at 308, JSUF 16.³ The parties discussed various tribal-state
9 class III gaming compacts in California, including the State's compacts with the Hoopa Valley
10 Tribe, Middletown Rancheria, and Sherwood Valley Rancheria, and the differences among them.
11 At the end of the discussion, Alturas indicated that it would review and choose a compact from
12 which it preferred to work and the State agreed it would then provide a Microsoft Word version
13 of the Tribe's selected compact. JRON Tab 21 at 295.

14 Following the compact negotiation meeting on November 19, 2021, the State and Alturas
15 exchanged several emails. JRON Tabs 26-28 at 310-450. These emails included Alturas
16 requesting and the State providing, on November 23, 2021, a copy of the tribal-state class III
17 gaming compact between the State and the Sherwood Valley Tribe (Sherwood Valley Compact).
18 *Id.* The parties scheduled another negotiation meeting for December 16, 2021. JRON Tab 27 at
19 314, JRON Tabs 29-31 at 452-462.

20 On December 13, 2021, in response to the State's requests, the Tribe stated that it
21 anticipated sending a redlined draft of the Sherwood Valley Compact later that day. JRON Tabs
22 32-33 at 464-470. Alturas also informed the State that the delay in sending the redline draft was
23 because they were considering the December 9, 2021 oral arguments that had been presented to
24 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in an IGRA case entitled *Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-*
25 *Wuk Indians v. State of California*, 42 F. 4th 1024 (9th Cir. 2022) (*Chicken Ranch*). JRON Tab

26 _____
27 ² To facilitate scheduling, and due to the ongoing COVID-19 state of emergency, both
28 compact negotiation meetings were held via videoconference.

³ All references to the JSUF cite to the Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts.

1 33 at 470. On December 14, 2021, Alturas requested to postpone the December 16, 2021,
2 negotiation meeting to December 30, 2021. The State agreed. JRON Tab 38 at 509.

3 On December 22, 2021, Alturas emailed the State a redlined draft of its proposed compact
4 using the State’s previously provided Sherwood Valley Compact. JRON Tabs 44-45 at 564-725.
5 The parties subsequently held their second videoconference compact negotiation meeting on
6 December 30, 2021. JRON Tab 41 at 539, JSUF 27. Less than three weeks later, on January 18,
7 2022, the State provided Alturas with detailed comments, explanations and questions in response
8 to the Tribe’s redline draft including several areas about which the State requested further
9 discussions. JRON Tabs 50-51 at 787-938. In addition, the State asked the Tribe for potential
10 dates for a third negotiation meeting. *Id.* at 787.⁴

11 On January 26, 2022, the Tribe responded to the State’s January 18, 2022, proposal by
12 letter. JRON Tab 53 at 946-955. After summarizing certain negotiation disputes between the
13 parties, the Tribe advised that it now was “willing to consider moderate revisions to its current
14 1999 Compact.” *Id.* In the letter’s conclusion, the Tribe reiterated its desire to make revisions to
15 its 1999 Compact rather than negotiate a new compact. The Tribe did not provide any further
16 edits to the draft compact or propose dates for a future negotiation meeting. *Id.*

17 On February 17, 2022, the State responded to the Tribe’s January 26, 2021 letter by
18 providing a summary of the parties’ compact negotiations to date. JRON Tabs 54-54a at 957-
19 964. While the letter acknowledged the Tribe’s concerns with some of the draft compact
20 provisions, the State reiterated its belief that the issues could be resolved through changes to
21 specific provisions in the draft compact. *Id.* The State reemphasized that at no point did it take
22 the position that the State would not negotiate or discuss the Tribe’s request for compact
23 revisions. *Id.* Indeed, the letter specifically advised that “[t]he State invites the Tribe to provide

24 _____
25 ⁴ In addition to completing two compact negotiation meetings with Alturas by the end of
26 2021, on January 26, 2022, the State tendered an offer and example amendment to the Tribe to
27 extend Alturas’ 1999 Compact for an additional year to June 30, 2023, subject to the Tribe’s
28 approval. JRON Tab 52 at 940-944. The State made this offer due to uncertainty created by the
Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs’ disapproval in November 2021 of three class III gaming
compacts ratified by the California Legislature, and a lack of confidence that the State and Tribe
could negotiate a new compact for approval under IGRA prior to the expiration of its 1999
Compact. *Id.* at 940-941.

1 alternative language so that we can find a mutually agreeable approach to these issues protective
2 of both the State’s interests and the Tribe’s concerns regarding its sovereign government.” *Id.*
3 The State’s letter concluded by repeating prior requests to schedule another compact negotiation
4 meeting. *Id.*

5 **III. ALTURAS’S DELAYED RESPONSES AND TERMINATION OF THE PARTIES’ ONGOING**
6 **COMPACT NEGOTIATIONS**

7 The State did not receive a response to its February 17, 2022, letter for five months.⁵ On
8 July 15, 2022, Alturas emailed the State indicating they would like to schedule a compact
9 negotiation session. JRON Tab 68a at 1009. Between July 15, 2022, and July 18, 2022, the
10 parties exchanged emails and agreed to a negotiation meeting to be held on August 30, 2022.
11 JRON Tabs 68b-68e at 1012-1023.

12 On July 28, 2022, Alturas sent the State a twenty-three page letter with fifty-four exhibits
13 totaling over two-thousand pages in response to the State’s February 17, 2022, letter. JRON Tabs
14 69-123 at 1027-3153. The Tribe claimed that the delay in responding to the State’s letter was due
15 to the Tribe conducting research and monitoring developments in connection with other tribal
16 compacts. *Id.* at 1027. Additionally, the Tribe stated it was monitoring pending litigation,
17 including *Chicken Ranch*. *Id.* Significantly, the Tribe spent the bulk of its letter demanding a
18 twenty-year extension of its 1999 Compact and declaring that successfully negotiating a new
19 compact with the State was not possible. *Id.* at 1028-1048. Notably, the Tribe included an offer
20 to continue negotiations with the State regarding “minor revisions to the 1999 Compact under
21 which it has successfully operated for more than 20 years.” *Id.* at 1048. In the letter’s closing,
22 the Tribe again made clear that its preference was to extend its 1999 Compact for an additional
23 twenty years. *Id.* at 1048-1049. The Tribe further declared that if the State would not agree to
24 extend the 1999 Compact for an additional twenty years then the State should execute a new

25 _____
26 ⁵ During this time, the State sent Alturas two offers to extend the Tribe’s 1999 Compact
27 to December 31, 2023. JRON Tabs 55-56 at 966-967, 969-970. On April 20, 2022, the Tribe
28 sent the executed documents for the compact extension. (JRON Tabs 58-60 at 977-986). On
June 1, 2022, the State notified the Tribe of the extension’s approval by the California
Legislature. JRON Tab 64 at 995-996.

1 compact with the same material terms as the 1999 Compact for a term of twenty years. *Id.* at
2 1048. Along with the letter, the Tribe’s attachments included a revised copy of the eighteen-
3 month compact extension that had recently been ratified by the California Legislature with a
4 proposed new termination date of December 31, 2043. *Id.* at 3151-3153.

5 The Ninth Circuit issued its decision in *Chicken Ranch* the same day as the Tribe’s letter.

6 On August 5, 2022, the State responded to the Tribe’s July 28, 2022 letter stating that due
7 to the recent Ninth Circuit decision in *Chicken Ranch* the State was “re-evaluating its most recent
8 compact offer” to the Tribe. JRON Tab 124 at 3155. The State explained that it would reach out
9 to the Tribe to reschedule another negotiation meeting following a 45-day review period. *Id.*

10 In a letter dated August 8, 2022, Alturas responded to the State’s August 5, 2022 letter
11 advising the State that it did not agree to any review period following the issuance of *Chicken*
12 *Ranch* and demanded that the State respond by August 12, 2022, to its request for the State to
13 either “extend [the Tribe’s] 1999 Compact for 20 years or execute a materially identical Model
14 Compact as requested by Alturas on July 28, 2022.” JRON Tab 125 at 3157-3158. The Tribe
15 again stated that it did not believe there was any reason to continue negotiations with the State
16 “regarding a materially different Tribal-State compact.” *Id.*

17 The State responded to the Tribe’s August 8, 2022, letter on August 12, 2022, reiterating
18 that in light of *Chicken Ranch*, the State needed to evaluate its prior draft compact offer to
19 Alturas. JRON Tab 126 at 3160. This evaluation process included considering “recent compact
20 disapproval letters issued by the U.S. Department of the Interior.” *Id.* The letter advised Alturas
21 that “[t]he State is not able to accept the Tribe’s proposal to extend its 1999 Compact or execute a
22 materially identical compact at this time, but plans to provide an updated draft compact to the
23 Tribe after completing its evaluation to facilitate negotiation of compact terms.” *Id.* Further, the
24 State reaffirmed its commitment to continuing negotiations and provide an updated draft compact
25 for discussion. *Id.*

26 On September 19, 2022, less than 45 days after notifying the Tribe of its intentions, the
27 State provided another update to Alturas. JRON Tabs 127-128 at 3162-3165. The State advised
28 that it had completed its reevaluation process of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Chicken Ranch*

1 and recent compact disapproval letters from the U.S. Department of the Interior. *Id.* at 3164.
2 Pursuant to that process, the State was prepared “to make significant changes to its previous
3 compact offer to the Tribe.” *Id.* The State’s letter detailed the following changes, while further
4 advising that additional changes were possible:

- 5 • Narrowing the definition of Gaming Facility to eliminate the need for an analysis of
6 the principal purpose of a structure. Instead, the definition would be based on the
7 building and structures in which class III gaming activity occurs.
- 8 • No longer requesting Tribal recognition of State spousal and child support orders for
9 employees of the Gaming Operation and Gaming Facility.
- 10 • Streamlining tort standards specific to claims by patrons and others lawfully on the
11 premises of the Gaming Facility. The tort requirements would allow the Tribe to
12 adopt its own procedures for resolution in Tribal court.
- 13 • Eliminating the environmental review provisions and requirement to enter into an
14 intergovernmental agreement with a neighboring jurisdiction. Further discussion
15 will be needed regarding appropriate mitigation of impacts from the Gaming Facility
16 on non-tribal governments.
- 17 • Simplifying standards and procedures for patron disputes and employment
18 discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims and providing the Tribe greater
19 discretion in determining the process to address those claims consistent with fairness
20 and due process.
- 21 • Removing the prohibition on tobacco sales to minors.
- 22 • Deleting arbitration provisions throughout the compact.

23 *Id.* at 3164-3165.

24 Although the State’s September 19, 2022 letter concluded with an offer to discuss detailed
25 compact concessions (*Id.* at 3165), Alturas failed to respond regarding any of these proposed
26 compact changes. Instead, later the same day, the Tribe served its Complaint on the State
27 Defendants. JSUF 41.

28 **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 authorizes summary judgment where the movant shows
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *T.W. Elec. Serv.*,

1 *Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n*, 809 F. 2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). Where the issue
2 before the court involves the proper interpretation of statutes and regulations, and the parties
3 agree on the “material” facts, the matter may be resolved as a matter of law on summary
4 judgment. *See Edwards v. Aguillard*, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987); *Shishido v. SIU-Pac. Dist.-*
5 *PMA Pension Plan*, 587 F. Supp. 112, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Under IGRA, a court will evaluate a
6 State’s good faith in negotiations objectively based on the record of negotiations. *Rincon Band of*
7 *Luiseno Indians v. Schwarzenegger*, 602 F. 3d 1019, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (*Rincon*).

8 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

9 IGRA sets forth a cooperative federalism model that balances the competing sovereign
10 interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes regarding the regulation
11 of tribal class III gaming. *Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton*, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002).
12 IGRA’s cooperative federalism role for state governments is found in its compacting requirement
13 which requires that states negotiate in good faith, allowing a tribe to sue a state in federal court
14 for the state’s failure to negotiate in good faith. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). During the last
15 twenty years, federal courts in the Ninth Circuit have interpreted IGRA to identify several
16 relevant factors to consider when determining, based on the record of negotiations, whether a
17 state negotiated in good faith. These factors include the following:

- 18 • Whether the State remained willing to meet and continue negotiations with the tribe;
- 19 • Whether the challenged compact provisions are part of negotiations or a unilateral
20 demand by the State;
- 21 • Whether the tribe declined to engage in further negotiations, and:
- 22 • Whether the tribe failed to respond to the State’s proposal before commencing
23 litigation.

24 *Pauma II*, 973 F. 3d at 962-965; *In re Indian Gaming Related Cases*, 331 F. 3d 1094 (9th Cir.
25 2003) (*Coyote Valley II*); *In re Indian Gaming Related Cases v. State of California*, 147 F. Supp.
26 2d 1011, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (*Coyote Valley I*).

1 Based on this case’s record in conjunction with these judicially identified relevant good
2 faith factors, the undisputed material facts establish that the State negotiated with Alturas in good
3 faith for two reasons.

4 First, the State negotiated in good faith because it attempted to move the negotiations
5 forward and never demanded that the final compact include compact provisions that the Tribe
6 considered unlawful. The record shows the State’s good faith negotiations, which included
7 providing sample compacts for the Tribe’s consideration, participating in phone calls, email
8 exchanges and two substantive videoconference compact negotiation meetings, showing a
9 willingness to continue additional negotiations to seek compromises on disputed matters, and
10 detailing significant changes it was willing to make to its prior proposed compact offer as a result
11 of the then-recent Ninth Circuit *Chicken Ranch* decision.

12 In these negotiations, the parties only exchanged one compact draft each. Alturas provided
13 its redline compact draft to the State on December 22, 2021. JRON Tab 45 at 576-725. The State
14 responded to this compact draft with its own redline compact draft on January 18, 2022. JRON
15 Tab 51 at 802-938. The State’s comments throughout its draft illustrate the common dialogue in
16 an ongoing negotiation. The State accepted numerous edits from the Tribe, albeit some with
17 modifications. *Id.* at 813, 816, 819, 820-821, 829-830, 831, 833, 838-839, 841, 846-847, 856-
18 857. The State rejected other proposed edits, but indicated where possible, its reasoning or that it
19 sought additional information from the Tribe in order to find compromise. *Id.* at 830, 837, 840,
20 844, 845, 858, 861, 862, 863, 926, 928. Even when not proposing edits in response to the Tribe’s
21 draft language, the State proposed multiple approaches to complex and difficult sections of the
22 compact. *Id.* at 882 (proposing different approaches to environmental review provisions), 919
23 (stating willingness to consider edits to minimum wage, maximum hour, child labor, and
24 overtime standards, but seeking information regarding Tribe’s current practice and policy). At no
25 point in the compact draft did the State indicate that its edits were a final demand or non-
26 negotiable.

27 Second, Alturas’s responses to the State’s efforts to move the compact negotiations forward
28 further substantiates that the State negotiated in good faith. Rather than seriously negotiating

1 through an exchange of proposed compact terms, the Tribe engaged in significant negotiation
2 delays totaling seventeen months. In addition to these delays, Alturas played hardball by pivoting
3 from the exchange of draft compacts to draw the parties closer to compromise to instead insisting
4 that the State agree to extend by twenty years its prior 1999 Compact or enter a compact
5 substantially identical to that compact. Ultimately, Alturas walked away from negotiations in the
6 fall of 2022 after the State informed the Tribe it was reviewing its offer to account for the recent
7 *Chicken Ranch* decision, and filed suit.

8 In short, the Tribe delayed negotiations, failed to propose revised terms for the State’s
9 consideration, and refused to engage in requested additional negotiations. Alturas now demands
10 this Court insert itself into the incomplete negotiations it caused by its dilatory tactics.⁶ Under
11 this record, it is undisputed that the State complied with its duty to negotiate in good faith under
12 IGRA.

13 ARGUMENT

14 I. THE STATE NEGOTIATED WITH ALTURAS IN GOOD FAITH IN COMPLIANCE WITH 15 IGRA

16 A. IGRA and Class III Tribal Gaming in California

17 To address concerns regarding the regulation of gambling on tribal lands, Congress passed
18 IGRA in 1988 as a “compromise solution to the difficult questions involving Indian gaming.”
19 *Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton*, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1091-92 (E.D. Cal. 2002), *aff’d*, 353 F. 3d 712
20 (9th Cir. 2003). IGRA provides “a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes”
21 and is an example of “‘cooperative federalism’ in that it seeks to balance the competing sovereign
22 interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes, by giving each a role in
23 the regulatory scheme.” *Id.* at 1092.

24 IGRA’s cooperative federalism statutory scheme makes class III gaming lawful on tribal
25 lands only if such activities are: (1) authorized by an ordinance or resolution adopted by the

26
27 ⁶ Alturas took these positions despite the State’s offer, and the Tribe’s agreement, to
28 extend the 1999 Compact to December 31, 2023, in order to provide additional time to resolve
uncertainty in negotiations due to compact disapprovals in November 2021 by the federal
government.

1 governing body of the Indian tribe and approved by the chairman of the National Indian Gaming
 2 Commission; (2) located in a state that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,
 3 organization, or entity; and (3) conducted in conformance with a tribal-state compact entered into
 4 by the Indian tribe and the state and approved by the Secretary of the United States Department of
 5 the Interior (Secretary). 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) & (3)(B). An Indian tribe is not authorized to
 6 operate class III gaming on its lands located in California absent a negotiated compact between
 7 the State and the tribe that is approved by the Secretary, or the implementation of “procedures” by
 8 the Secretary following a finding that a State failed to negotiate in good faith as required by
 9 IGRA. *Coyote Valley II*, 331 F. 3d at 1097-98.

10 IGRA’s tribal-state compacting provision accords states “the right to negotiate with tribes
 11 located within their borders regarding aspects of class III gaming that might affect legitimate
 12 State interests.” *Coyote Valley II*, 331 F. 3d at 1097. Class III gaming “includes the types of
 13 high-stakes games usually associated with Nevada-style gambling. Class III gaming is subject to
 14 a greater degree of federal-state regulation than either class I [social games] or class II [bingo and
 15 certain non-banked card games] gaming.” *Id.* In 2000, California voters approved Proposition
 16 1A authorizing tribes to operate class III slot machines, banked and percentage card games, and
 17 certain lottery games.⁷ Cal. Const. Art. IV, § 19(f). As a result of Proposition 1A and subsequent
 18 tribal-state compacts, tribal gaming revenues in California by 2021 reached approximately \$12
 19 billion.⁸ Today, sixty-seven tribal gaming casinos⁹ operate pursuant to tribal-state class III
 20 compacts with the State.

21
 22
 23 ⁷ *Coyote Valley II* recounts extensively the events leading to IGRA’s passage, and the
 24 subsequent compact negotiations between California and dozens of Indian tribes resulting in the
 original 1999 Compact.

25 ⁸ The National Indian Gaming Commission reported tribal gaming revenues for 2022 to
 26 be \$11.8 billion in its Sacramento Region and \$40.9 billion nationally. The Sacramento Region
 covers California and Northern Nevada. Only one tribal casino operates in Northern Nevada.
[GGRFY22_071923_Final.pdf \(nigc.gov\)](https://www.nigc.gov/GGRFY22_071923_Final.pdf)

27 ⁹ The California Gambling Control Commission lists sixty-seven tribal casinos presently
 28 operating in California. [http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/documents/Tribal/2023/List_of-
 Casinos_alpha_by_casino_name.pdf](http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/documents/Tribal/2023/List_of-Casinos_alpha_by_casino_name.pdf).

1 **B. The Relevant Factors for Assessing a State’s Good Faith Negotiations**
2 **Under IGRA**

3 To prevail under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), a tribe must show that (1) no tribal-state
4 compact has been entered and (2) the state either failed to respond to the tribe’s request to
5 negotiate or did not respond to the request in good faith. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II). But
6 negotiations are, of course, a two-way street. *See Pauma II*, 973 F. 3d at 963 (holding that a
7 state’s duty to negotiate in good faith does not compel blind negotiation). A state’s ability to
8 negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually acceptable compact assumes that a tribe works towards
9 the same goal.

10 While IGRA requires “good faith” negotiations, the statute does not define this important
11 term. *Coyote Valley I*, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1020; *see* 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). In making its
12 good-faith determination, the court “may take into account the public interest, public safety,
13 criminality, financial integrity, and adverse economic impacts on existing gaming activities,” and
14 “shall consider any demand by the State for direct taxation of the Indian tribe or of any Indian
15 lands as evidence that the State has not negotiated in good faith.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
16 Courts also enforce the requirement that “IGRA strictly limits the topics that states may include in
17 tribal-state Class III compacts to those directly related to the operation of gaming activities.”
18 *Chicken Ranch*, 42 F. 4th at 1029. A state may be found to have failed to negotiate in good faith
19 if it “insists on” or “demands” compact terms that are outside of the scope of IGRA. *Chicken*
20 *Ranch*, 42 F. 4th at 1037-39. However, a state may take a hardline stance if it is in line with
21 legitimate state interests related to gaming and IGRA’s purposes. *Rincon*, 602 F. 3d at 1038; *see*
22 *also Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Newsom*, 919 F. 3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that IGRA
23 unambiguously permitted the negotiation and inclusion of durational limits in a compact).

24 A state’s good faith is evaluated “objectively based on the record of negotiations.” *Rincon*,
25 602 F. 3d at 1041. The reason for such treatment is that the negotiation history between states
26 and tribes is not a subject matter that lends itself to much dispute. The proposals, counter-
27 proposals, letters, and other documents that are part of the negotiations constitute the evidence
28 that courts consider when determining good faith.

1 In regard to the 1999 Compacts, after reviewing the record of negotiations between the
2 State and the tribes, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected a tribe’s numerous
3 procedural and substantive complaints that the State failed to negotiate in good faith under IGRA.
4 *Coyote Valley II*, 331 F. 3d at 1107-17; *Coyote Valley I*, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22. In doing so,
5 the courts identified several relevant factors to consider when determining whether a state
6 negotiated in good faith. These factors include the following:

- 7 • *Actively Negotiate*: Did the State remain “willing to meet with the tribe for further”
8 compact negotiations? *Coyote Valley II*, 331 F. 3d at 1110 (Ninth Circuit finding that
9 the negotiation history showed that the State “actively negotiated with Indian tribes”).
- 10 • *Give and take*: Are the tribe’s “challenged provisions” the result of negotiations or
11 instead “unilateral demands by the State”? *Coyote Valley I*, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1021
12 (district court finding that the challenged “Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance” was not
13 a “unilateral” State demand).
- 14 • *Negotiation termination*: Was it the tribe, and not the State, that “declined to engage
15 in further negotiations”? *Coyote Valley I*, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22 (district court
16 finding that during negotiations the tribe “apparently [had] not contacted the State to
17 arrange any further IGRA negotiations”).
- 18 • *Unreasonable Terms*: Did the State insist on or demand provisions categorically
19 forbidden by the terms of IGRA and not directly related to the operation of class III
20 gaming activities? *Chicken Ranch*, 42 F. 4th at 1029, 1037-39 (Ninth Circuit holding
21 that the State failed to negotiate in good faith by insisting on broad environmental,
22 tort, and family law provisions that were not directly related to the operation of class
23 III gaming activities); *see also Coyote Valley II*, 331 F. 3d at 1110-17 (Ninth Circuit
24 holding that the State did not negotiate in bad faith by refusing to enter into a compact
25 without the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, the Special Distribution Fund, and the
26 Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance, topics which the court found to be within the scope
27 of IGRA).

1 In addition to the above factors, the Ninth Circuit further explored the meaning of IGRA’s
2 good-faith standard in a suit filed by the Pauma Band of Luiseno Indians of the Pauma & Yuima
3 Reservation (Pauma) against the State of California and Governor Gavin Newsom (State) for
4 allegedly failing to negotiate in good faith during IGRA compact negotiations.

5 In that case, in November 2014, Pauma sought an amendment to its 1999 compact to offer
6 on-track horse racing and wagering and an expanded set of lottery games. *Pauma II*, 973
7 F. 3d at 959-960. The parties met twice and exchanged correspondence for approximately a year
8 in relation to this request. *Id.* at 960. The State repeatedly expressed its willingness to negotiate
9 over Pauma’s request. *Id.* at 966. At the second meeting, in November 2015, Pauma indicated it
10 wanted to negotiate an entirely new compact and not just the previously requested new types of
11 gaming. *Id.* at 960. In January 2016, the State confirmed an agreement to renegotiate Pauma’s
12 1999 compact in full and told Pauma that it “look[ed] forward” to receiving a draft compact from
13 Pauma with Pauma’s plans for on-track betting. *Id.* at 961. The State encouraged Pauma to
14 circulate draft language so it could analyze the information and respond in writing. *Id.* at 960.
15 Rather than propose a draft compact or disclose any information about the on-track facility,
16 Pauma notified the State that it wanted to separately negotiate each item of the new compact. *Id.*
17 at 961. Citing negotiating efficiency, limitations on the negotiation process and lack of a legal
18 basis in IGRA, the State rejected Pauma’s piecemeal negotiation approach and advised that it
19 would send a “complete draft compact to guide our future discussions.” *Id.* The subsequent 140-
20 page draft compact sent to Pauma addressed a broad array of topics. *Id.* Pauma never responded
21 but, like Alturas here, filed suit. *Id.*

22 In its de novo review of the record, the Ninth Circuit upheld summary judgment for the
23 State because it actively participated in the negotiations and tried to advance the negotiations. *Id.*
24 at 966. The Court noted that the record was replete with examples of the State’s fruitless requests
25 that Pauma provide specific details about its proposed new facility and the fact that Pauma never
26 responded to the draft compact. *Id.* at 966.

27 The Ninth Circuit’s *Pauma II* decision provides a roadmap to additional factors for a court
28 to consider when determining whether a state negotiated in good faith:

- 1 • *Efforts Expended*: Does the record reflect an effort by the state to reach agreement
2 rather than providing empty promises? *Pauma II*, 973 F. 3d at 962-63 (holding that
3 the record reflected extensive efforts by the state to address tribe’s interest in
4 negotiating lottery games).
- 5 • *Tribal Proposal*: Did the tribe provide specific details about the terms it envisioned in
6 response to state requests? *Pauma II*, 973 F. 3d at 963-64 (finding that a state’s duty
7 to negotiate in good faith does not compel blind negotiation).
- 8 • *State Proposal*: Did the state propose terms in a draft compact? *Pauma II*, 973 F. 3d
9 at 965 (holding that “the State’s decision to circulate a proposed draft compact for
10 future discussions does not evidence bad faith” Rather, providing a draft
11 compact “demonstrates a proper motivation: the State endeavored to move the
12 negotiations toward the finish line”).
- 13 • *Continuing Negotiations*: Did the state remain willing to meet when the tribe filed its
14 lawsuit under IGRA? *Pauma II*, 973 F. 3d at 962 (holding that “the state of
15 negotiations at the commencement of a lawsuit is a relevant factor for courts to
16 consider when analyzing bad faith claims under IGRA”).
- 17 • *Premature Litigation*: Did the tribe fail to respond to the state’s proposal prior to
18 litigation? *Pauma II*, 973 F. 3d at 962 (“We abstain from inserting ourselves into
19 incomplete negotiations”).

20 **C. Applying the Good Faith Factors to this Case’s Record Shows that the**
21 **State Negotiated in Good Faith with Alturas**

22 Alturas’s Complaint attempts to plead several claims as to why the State failed to negotiate
23 in good faith. The first claim alleges that the State demanded compact provisions that exceeded
24 IGRA’s permissible scope. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 51–52. The second claim alleges that the
25 State attempted to impose an unlawful tax, fee, charge or assessment. *Id.* at 52-53. The third
26 claim charges that the State demanded the Tribe to enter into impermissible separate agreements
27 with the County of Modoc and Caltrans. *Id.* at 53-54. The fourth claim contends that the State
28 unlawfully insisted upon control over the Tribe’s courts. *Id.* at 53-54. Finally, the fifth claim

1 argues that the State engaged in so-called sham or surface bargaining. *Id.* at 55-56.¹⁰ But despite
2 these allegations, this case's record demonstrates that the State made extensive efforts to move
3 negotiations with Alturas forward despite the delays caused by the Tribe, and the State remained
4 willing to continue meeting and actively sought to negotiate with Alturas on each of its claims at
5 the time Alturas filed suit.

6 First, Alturas cannot prevail on any of its five IGRA claims because the record
7 demonstrates that the State attempted to move the compact negotiations forward, and never
8 demanded—much less insisted—that Alturas include any compact provisions that the Tribe
9 considered unlawful. Rather, the State responded positively to the Tribe's initial request to
10 renegotiate (JRON Tab 2 at 4), provided three sample compacts for the Tribe's consideration
11 (JRON Tabs 14, 15, and 28 at 48-193, 195-282, and 319-450), and participated in an initial phone
12 call on October 27, 2020 to discuss holding compact negotiations (JRON Tab 12 at 40-41).
13 Further, the State participated in two substantive compact negotiation meetings on November 19,
14 2021 and December 30, 2021. After the State received Alturas's redlined proposed compact
15 based upon the previously provided Sherwood Valley Compact (JRON Tabs 44, 45 at 564, 576-
16 725), the State responded on January 18, 2022, with detailed comments, explanations, questions,
17 and a request for a third negotiation meeting (JRON Tab 50, 51 at 787, 803-938). The State's
18 proposed compact draft illustrated the natural give and take of a fluid negotiation process and not
19 a take-it-or-leave-it position by the State.

20 Importantly, after the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Chicken Ranch* was issued, the State
21 informed Alturas it was conducting a review of the decision and its prior proposed offer. JRON
22 Tab 124 at 3155. The facts in the Ninth Circuit's *Chicken Ranch* case differ sharply from the
23 facts in this case. In *Chicken Ranch*, the negotiations between the 60 tribes that made up the
24 Compact Tribes Steering Committee, which included the plaintiff tribes, had been ongoing for
25 years. *Chicken Ranch* 42 F. 4th at 1030. Between 2014 and 2019, the state and the plaintiff
26 tribes held 39 days of in-person negotiation sessions, in addition to numerous smaller sessions

27 ¹⁰ Alturas' sixth and seventh claims in its Complaint also allege violations of California
28 Government Code section 12012.25. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 55-57. The Court granted the
State's motion to dismiss these claims with prejudice on April 20, 2023. Order, ECF No. 38.

1 focused on discrete issues. *Id.* Over that time, the state provided at least twelve full draft
2 compacts to the plaintiff tribes and the plaintiff tribes offered approximately fourteen drafts of
3 their own. *Id.* In contrast to the negotiations with Alturas, in *Chicken Ranch* the state “refused to
4 accept any compact that did not include the challenged topics of negotiation.” *Id.* at 1029. In the
5 case at hand, the negotiations had just begun. Further, the State advised Alturas that it was
6 willing to compromise on key compact terms in light of both *Chicken Ranch* and the November
7 2022 compact disapproval letters from the U. S. Department of Interior. JRON Tab 127, 128 at
8 3162-3165. The State specifically identified changes it was willing to make to address the
9 environmental, intergovernmental agreement, and tort provisions that are now raised in the
10 Tribe’s first, second, and third claims. *Id.* at 3165. These facts clearly reveal the State’s
11 extensive efforts to negotiate and reach agreement with Alturas on a new compact, up to and
12 including, the day the State was served with Alturas’s premature lawsuit. Additionally, by
13 proposing substantial revisions to the draft compact, the State demonstrated a willingness to
14 modify the compact terms and its motivation and desire to move the compact negotiations
15 forward, all factors specified by the courts showing good faith.

16 This undisputed record shows that far from the allegation in Alturas’s fifth claim for relief
17 that the State engaged in surface or sham bargaining, the State was actively negotiating with
18 Alturas and remained “willing to meet with the tribe for further” compact negotiations. *Coyote*
19 *Valley II*, 331 F. 3d at 1110. And, contrary to Alturas’s first, second, third, and fourth claims that
20 the State was attempting to impose unlawful compact terms on Alturas, the State in fact
21 demonstrated a willingness to discuss proposed compact language and to remain flexible. This is
22 clearly illustrated by the State’s comments and questions regarding Alturas’s proposed redline
23 compact, the State’s request for a third negotiation meeting, and its continued willingness to
24 further compromise following the issuance of *Chicken Ranch*. The record shows that the State
25 was neither making “unilateral demands” nor declining to engage in further negotiations. *Coyote*
26 *Valley I*, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22. Instead, the State sought “to continue the negotiations and
27 move them forward – not wrap them up.” *Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California*,
28 343 F. Supp. 3d 952, 975 (S.D. Cal. 2018). As the Ninth Circuit held in *Pauma II*, “[b]efore

1 litigating the substance of the State’s bargaining position, [the Tribe] needed to at least raise its
2 objections with the State.” *Pauma II*, 973 F. 3d at 964. Similar to *Pauma II*, in this case the
3 “State did not throw in the towel” regarding negotiations. *Id.* at 966. Alturas refused to allow the
4 State 45 days to review its offer in light of the *Chicken Ranch* decision (JRON Tab 125 at 3157-
5 3158) and refused to negotiate or discuss the State’s proposed changes following the State’s
6 review of that decision. Instead, despite months of being nonresponsive during the negotiation
7 period, it was the Tribe that refused to engage with the State any further and swiftly filed suit.

8 Second, Alturas’s responses to the State’s proactive efforts to move the compact
9 negotiations forward further demonstrates why the State did not fail to negotiate in good faith.
10 Rather than seriously negotiating through an exchange of proposed compact terms, the Tribe
11 engaged in significant negotiation delays. These delays included a nearly one year delay, from
12 October 28, 2020, to October 22, 2021, during which the Tribe failed to take action with respect
13 to the State’s stated willingness to engage in compact negotiations. The Tribe also delayed for
14 over five months, from February 17, 2022, to July 28, 2022, responding to the State’s request for
15 further discussions to seek compromises on disputed compact provisions. Given the relatively
16 short period of time of compact negotiations between the State and Alturas, these seventeen
17 months of delay are significant. Moreover, these delays make Alturas’s decision to walk away
18 from negotiations particularly troubling. In short, Alturas delayed negotiations, refused to engage
19 in requested additional negotiations to reach compromises following the *Chicken Ranch* decision,
20 and prematurely sought relief before the parties had reached an impasse.

21 When Alturas left the negotiation process, there was plenty of time for the parties to explore
22 compromises through negotiations consistent with recent developments in federal case law.¹¹
23 IGRA’s cooperative federalism model supports this sovereign-to-sovereign negotiation approach,
24 rather than Alturas’s rush towards litigation. Accordingly, under this specific record, the State
25 did not violate its duty to negotiate in good faith under IGRA.

26
27 ¹¹ Alturas’s negotiation gamesmanship was entirely unnecessary because the record
28 shows that the parties extended Alturas’s 1999 Compact to December 31, 2023. JRON Tabs 58,
59 and 60 at 977, 979, and 983-986.

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CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons and authorities, the State respectfully requests this Court to grant summary judgment in its favor.

Dated: August 11, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name: Alturas Indian Rancheria v. Newsom, et al. No. 2:22-cv-01486-KJM-DMC

I hereby certify that on August 11, 2023, I caused to be electronically filed the following documents with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:

STATE DEFENDANTS' POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I certify that **all** participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on August 11, 2023, at Sacramento, California.

Linda Thorpe
Declarant

/s/ Linda Thorpe
Signature