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7  
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
9

10 JOSEPH A. PAKOOTAS, an individual  
and enrolled member of the Confederated  
11 Tribes of the Colville Reservation; and  
DONALD R. MICHEL, an individual and  
12 enrolled member of the Confederated  
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, and  
13 THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF  
THE COLVILLE RESERVATION,  
14

15 Plaintiffs,

16 *and*

17 STATE OF WASHINGTON,

18 Plaintiff/Intervenor,

19 v.

20 TECK COMINCO METALS LTD., a  
Canadian corporation,  
21

22 Defendant.  
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NO. 2:04-CV-0256-SAB

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO TECK  
METALS LTD.’S MOTION FOR  
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
ON THE COLVILLE TRIBES’  
“TRIBAL SERVICE LOSS” CLAIM

NOTED FOR HEARING:  
DECEMBER 14, 2023 AT 1:30 P.M.

WITH ORAL ARGUMENT

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO TECK’S MPSJ ON TSL  
CLAIM- 1

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Teck Metals Ltd. (“Teck”) seeks dismissal of CCT’s tribal service loss claim arguing (1) even though CERCLA authorizes recovery of damages by a tribal trustee, and even though relevant regulations and caselaw provide for recovery of service losses, CCT, acting as a natural resource trustee, cannot recover them; (2) CCT’s claim for cultural losses are not cognizable as service losses; (3) CCT’s service losses due to Teck’s contamination of the UCR are unrelated to the natural resource injuries alleged herein; and (4) CCT cannot prove its claim because it has not addressed “scaling” and “baseline” even though these terms are not mentioned in the elements of the claim and reside only in regulations that Teck concedes are not binding. None of this persuades, as we explain below. In short, CERCLA authorizes CCT’s recovery of damages, and such damages include service losses, including use and nonuse values due to natural resource injuries. We observe at the outset that other than its first argument whether service losses by Tribes are cognizable, Teck’s arguments target CCT’s restoration plan approach to damages and did not address two of the three damages formulations offered by CCT (total value and lost river use) and consequently its motion fails on these points.

## II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

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### 1. Background.

This Phase III adjudication of natural resource damages follows the Court’s Phase I adjudication of Teck’s responsibility for releases of hazardous substances in the UCR based on its acknowledged use of the UCR as a free waste dump for

1 millions of tons of slag and effluent generated at its Trail smelter. ECF 1955 at 4.  
2 In Phase II, this Court determined that Teck is a responsible party under CERCLA  
3 based on releases of its hazardous substances in the UCR and ordered Teck to pay  
4 CCT's response costs in the amount of \$8,253,676.65. ECF 2417 at 34.  
5

6 Section 9607(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response  
7 Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) authorizes recovery of natural  
8 resource damages (NRD) by Indian tribes as well as the federal government and  
9 states. The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (CCT) and the State of  
10 Washington (State), acting as natural resource trustees, have asserted such claims.  
11 CCT is one of four trustees who, in 2007, formed a trustee council to investigate  
12 and assess natural resource injuries in the UCR. The trustees have developed joint  
13 claims identifying natural resource injuries and resulting service losses and  
14 Plaintiffs have asserted them in this action. They include compelling evidence that  
15 Teck's hazardous substances are toxic to benthic organisms (or "benthos") in the  
16 UCR sediment and have resulted in elevated mercury in fish leading to fish  
17 advisories. These opinions are described in detail in the previously-submitted  
18 reports and declarations of Joel Blum, Dimitri Vlassopoulos, William Clements,  
19 and Jesse Sinclair. ECF Nos. 2685, 2698, 2700, 2703; *see also generally* ECF  
20 Nos. 2667, 2673, 2684. Teck does not deny that its metals are toxic to benthos  
21 and it concedes that mercury in the UCR have led to fish advisories. Morrison  
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PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO TECK'S MPSJ ON TSL  
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1 Deposition<sup>1</sup> at 367-68; Teck’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF 2778  
2 (“SMF”) ¶ 14. Plaintiffs employed a habitat equivalency analysis to calculate the  
3 cost of restoration of damaged habitat as well as calculation of lost fishing trips  
4 due to elevated mercury in fish. *See* Domanski Report, ECF 2679-23. On review  
5 of this evidence, Teck’s expert conceded that natural resource damages have been  
6 proved. *See* Morrison Dep. at 367-68.

7  
8 2. CCT’s tribal service loss claims.

9 Along with the joint claims asserted with the State, CCT also has  
10 investigated and assessed natural resource service losses specific to the Tribes as  
11 authorized by 42 USC § 9607(f) (“liability...to an Indian Tribe...”). Such claims  
12 for lost services to tribes have featured in many natural resource damage  
13 assessments.<sup>2</sup> Declaration of Adam Domanski in Support of Response to Teck  
14 Metals Ltd.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Colville Tribes’  
15 “Tribal Service Loss” Claim (“Domanski Decl.”) ¶¶ 9, 13-14.  
16

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18 <sup>1</sup> All cited deposition excerpts are attached as exhibits to the accompanying  
19 Declaration of Paul J. Dayton in Support of Response to Teck Metals Ltd.’s  
20 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Colville Tribes’ “Tribal Service  
21 Loss” Claim (“Dayton Decl.”) unless otherwise indicated.

22  
23 <sup>2</sup> Indeed, Teck’s Motion cites a tribal service loss settlement in the  
24 Akwasasne claim which was larger than the physical remediation settlement. ECF  
25 2777 at 9-10, ECF 2679-10 (Alfred Report) at 1. And, in some respects the work in  
26 that case was a model for CCT’s approach here. Teck SMF, ECF 2778 at ¶ 45.



1 CCT has invoked Plaintiffs' proof concerning toxicity to benthos and  
2 elevated mercury in fish to satisfy Section 9607's requirement of injury. ECF  
3 2779-2; *see also* ECF 2679-10 (Alfred Report), 2720 (Alfred Decl. ¶ 10), and  
4 2679-23 (Domanski Report). Relying on these experts' evidence of injury, CCT  
5 experts developed proof of natural resource damages—specifically cultural service  
6 losses due to Teck's contamination of the river, the total value of an  
7 uncontaminated river and the lost river trips due to elevated mercury in fish.

8 CCT took three approaches to developing its proof of tribal service losses.  
9 First, it conducted a tribal service loss investigation to identify service losses  
10 resulting from Teck's contamination of the UCR and developed a restoration plan  
11 to redress such losses; second, it retained Dr. David Layton and Mr. Robert  
12 Paterson to design and conduct a contingent valuation study determining the total  
13 value of an uncontaminated river; and third, it retained Mr. Robert Unsworth to  
14 calculate the value of lost river trips specific to CCT members resulting from  
15 Teck's contamination, particularly elevated mercury prompting fish advisories.<sup>3</sup>

16 Taking the tribal service loss investigation first, in 2013, CCT engaged Dr.  
17 Gerald Taiaiake Alfred, Ph.D, to serve as Principal Investigator for tribal service  
18

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23 <sup>3</sup> Teck has argued that this claim overlaps Plaintiffs' joint claim for lost  
24 fishing trips, but CCT's expert took account of such an overlap in his opinion.  
25 SMF ¶ 17; CCT's Statement of Disputed Material Facts ("SDF") ¶ 9.  
26 Quantification of any overlap is an issue for trial.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO TECK'S MPSJ ON TSL  
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1 loss study based on his work on the Akwasasne tribal service loss claim and  
2 extensive expertise in indigenous cultural issues. SMF ¶ 38. In 2013, with funding  
3 from the Department of Interior (DOI) and in consultation with DOI, CCT  
4 developed an approach to such an investigation, culminating in a Final Quality  
5 Assurance Project Plan (QAPP) to conduct a tribal service loss investigation. *Id.* at  
6 ¶ 43; Fraser Dep. at 480-81.

8 Implementing the QAAP, the investigation encompassed oral history  
9 research, literature review and review of an extensive survey of UCR resources  
10 jointly conducted by CCT and EPA (Westat Survey). Assessment of Services Lost  
11 by the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation as a Result of Injuries to  
12 Natural Resources at the Upper Columbia River Site (October 23, 2018), ECF  
13 2679-9, 2679-10 (“TSL Report”) at 9-13. The oral history component included  
14 interviews of 45 tribal members selected for their knowledge of the impact of  
15 Teck’s contamination. Alfred Dep. at 19-20, 76-77, 80; Fraser Dep at 157-58;  
16 Declaration of Whitney Fraser in Support of Response to Teck Metals Ltd.’s  
17 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Colville Tribes’ “Tribal Service  
18 Loss” Claim (“Fraser Decl.”) ¶ 4. The investigation did not attempt assessment of  
19 all members’ experience or representative experience, because CCT was  
20 attempting to understand the extent of CCT’s service loss for the purpose of  
21 restoring such loss as such restoration is a central goal of natural resource  
22 recovery. Alfred Dep. at 20, 76-77; Fraser Dep. at 157-58; Fraser Decl. ¶ 5. CCT  
23 was not attempting to derive a “per capita” injury as might be done in a class  
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1 action or mass tort claim, so there was no reason to attempt to understand the  
2 experience of each or all tribal members. Fraser Decl. ¶ 5.

3 Dr. Alfred reviewed and approved the features of the investigation and the  
4 questions to be asked. TSL Report at 14-19; Alfred Dep. at 33-37. Whitney Fraser,  
5 a tribal consultant, implemented the interview process with help from tribal  
6 employees. Fraser Dep. at 416-17. All of the interviews were transcribed and they  
7 were later summarized by Ms. Fraser. *Id.* at 417-418; TSL Report at 12-13. These  
8 interviews demonstrated extensive cultural disruption resulting from Teck's  
9 contamination of the UCR. *See* TSL Report at 19-79.

10  
11 In addition to interviewing tribal members and reviewing the Westat Survey  
12 results, the tribal service loss investigation included an extensive consultation with  
13 a tribal expert, Shelley Boyd, on cultural issues, particularly the necessity of  
14 incorporating language learning as part of cultural reconnection. *See* TSL Report  
15 at 19-79; Fraser Dep. at 310-11, 387. After this work was complete, a draft report  
16 was completed – authored by Dr. Alfred, Ms. Fraser and Ms. Boyd – and  
17 submitted to DOI. Fraser Dep. at 460-62. The report identified specific accounts of  
18 disruption in the CCT members' cultural experience. ECF 2679-10 (Alfred  
19 Report) at 8-11; Alfred Dep. at 71-79. To be clear, neither the TSL Report nor Dr.  
20 Alfred's opinions in the case claimed that Teck's contamination had caused loss of  
21 specific cultural attributes such as language. Instead, it described disrupted  
22 cultural connection to the river that might be restored by language programs as  
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1 well as other responses. ECF 2679-11 (Alfred Report) at 8-11; Fraser Dep. at 310-  
2 11, 335.

3 The TSL Report also included a proposed restoration plan to redress the  
4 cultural losses it had identified. TSL Report at 80-85, Fraser Dep. at 373-74.<sup>4</sup>  
5 The plan had four components, each directed at restoring cultural loss from  
6 contamination of the river: (1) monitoring of the UCR to confirm water and  
7 sediment conditions; (2) selected slag removal to remove visual indicators of  
8 contamination; (3) cultural programs and buildings to enable restoration of cultural  
9 attributes, including language leading to improved connection to the river; and (4)  
10 acquisition of land. TSL Report at 80-85, Fraser Dep. at 373-74  
11  
12

13 Dr. Alfred reviewed the restoration plan developed by CCT and opined that  
14 “it is the best conceived and most appropriate response to the Tribe’s losses and  
15 will directly address the cultural impacts due to natural resource injuries caused by  
16 the release of Teck’s metals.” *Id.* at 8. In reaching this opinion, Dr. Alfred noted  
17 that “Tribal members do not view financial compensation as an acceptable  
18 substitute for the restoration of the natural environment and cultural restoration.”  
19 *Id.* This is confirmed by the work of Dr. Layton and Mr. Paterson discussed below.  
20 The CCT restoration plan was also reviewed and validated by Mr. Sirois. He  
21 explained that the plan aligned with the CBC resolution identifying tribal  
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25 <sup>4</sup> This plan was based on concepts developed for a 2015 settlement  
26 discussion with Teck. Fraser Dep. at 373-374.

1 restoration goals and “directly addresses the cultural losses and experiences as a  
2 result of Teck’s slag contamination.” ECF 2679-22 (Sirois Report) at 5-7. He  
3 reviewed each category of the restoration plan, validated their costs and their  
4 effectiveness in reaching restoration goals. *See id.* at 9-17.

5  
6 This plan was reviewed by John Sirois, a CCT leader with extensive  
7 experience in Tribal governance and chairman of the Colville Business Council  
8 and many roles in Tribal programs implementing cultural goals. He opined that it  
9 would be effective in redressing cultural loss. Sirois Dep. at 40-42, 176-77. Teck  
10 quibbles that he could not know if it was effective until it was implemented (which  
11 is logical), but based on his experience he had substantial reason to expect that it  
12 would redress cultural loss. *Id.* at 68-69.

13  
14 Based on this work and his expertise in the field, Dr. Alfred has offered his  
15 opinions in this case. He concluded that “injuries to natural resources have had  
16 widespread detrimental “non-use” effects on Tribal members who because of their  
17 understanding of the injuries caused specifically by the release of Teck’s metals,  
18 chose not to engage in practices that were central to the Tribes’ cultural life.” ECF  
19 2679-11 (Alfred Report) at 3. In particular, he observed that “in analyzing the  
20 information presented to me on the views of CCT Tribal members, it is clear to me  
21 that the injuries caused by the release of Teck’s metals have affected Tribal  
22 members’ ability to continue being who they are in the internal and inter-tribal  
23 frame of reference that defines their existence...” *Id.* at 4. Specific to use values,  
24 Dr. Alfred explained that “because of the injuries to natural resources caused by  
25  
26

1 Teck’s releases, Tribal members have chosen not to relate to the riverine  
2 environment and have discontinued cultural practices central to their ancestral way  
3 of being and identity as a nation.” *Id.* at 6.

4 In offering these opinions, Dr. Alfred took account of baseline conditions.  
5 He noted that more than a generation has passed since the Grand Coulee Dam was  
6 constructed and Tribal members have adapted to changes in the natural  
7 environment caused by other factors. *Id.* at 2; Alfred Dep. at 76-77. And, he  
8 observed that responses to the TSL study questions were specific to injury caused  
9 by Teck. *See* ECF 2679-11 (Alfred Report) at 3; Alfred Dep. at 71-79.

10 Dr. Alfred’s tribal service investigation employed qualitative research  
11 methods to identify cultural loss. ECF 2720 (Alfred Decl.) ¶¶ 6-10. CCT also  
12 retained experts to undertake a quantitative analysis of damages resulting from  
13 Teck’s contamination. Dr. Layton and Mr. Paterson designed and conducted a  
14 stated preference study intended to identify the total value of the loss due to Teck’s  
15 contamination. ECF 2670-1 (Layton & Paterson Report) at 3; Declaration of David  
16 Layton, Ph. D. in Support of Response to Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion for Partial  
17 Summary Judgment on the Colville Tribes’ “Tribal Service Loss” Claim (“Layton  
18 Decl.”) ¶ 4. The survey form explained that contamination of the river had caused  
19 injury to some creatures living in the sediment. ECF 2670-1 (Layton & Paterson  
20 Report), Att. B. The results showed the minimum value associated with an  
21 uncontaminated river – a lower bound – in the amount of \$165,000,000. ECF  
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1 2670-1 (Layton & Paterson Report) at 14; Layton Decl. ¶ 6. Teck has not  
2 challenged this approach to damages on this motion.

3 CCT also employed Mr. Unsworth to calculate a specific use value—the  
4 value of river trips not taken because of elevated mercury causing fish advisories.  
5 Plaintiffs have presented a joint claim on this subject, but Mr. Unsworth’s work  
6 focuses on the specific loss to the CCT members. ECF 2672-2 (Unsworth Report)  
7 at 1-2. Teck has not challenged this calculation of damages on this motion.  
8

9 Dr. Domanski, an economist with substantial experience in NRDA  
10 assessments, has reviewed this expert work and underlying information and opined  
11 on CCT’s damages in this case. With respect to the restoration plan approach to  
12 damages, Dr. Domanski’s report explains how cultural services can be restored  
13 through a set of programs designed to replicate community cultural and spiritual  
14 linkages. ECF 2679-24 (Domanski Report) at 4; *see* Domanski Dep. (Vol. 1) at  
15 68; Domanski Decl. ¶¶ 11-16.<sup>5</sup> Damages are calculated based on the cost of the  
16 restoration package needed to replace lost services. Domanski Dep at (Vol. 1) at  
17 188-189. Dr. Domanski explained that “Compensation through cultural restoration  
18 programming is a type of service-to-service scaling.” ECF 2679-24 (Domanski  
19  
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23  
24 <sup>5</sup> CCT has provided a declaration from Dr. Domanski because use of  
25 deposition excerpts alone provides disjointed account of this issue. Dr. Domanski’s  
26 declaration is consistent with his deposition testimony in all respects.

1 Report) at 9. In Opinion 4, he explains his use of a “restoration-scaling approach.  
2 *Id.* at 18; *see* Domanski Dep. (Vol II) at 67.

3 This approach identifies cultural loss resulting from the presence of Teck’s  
4 contaminants in the river. Domanski Dep. (Vol. 1) at 196-197. “It’s a cultural  
5 service injury that led to changes in behavior in connection with the river because  
6 of contamination in the river.” *Id.* at 196; *see also* Domanski Decl. ¶ 13. The  
7 cultural resource that is injured is persons’ connection with the river and series of  
8 cultural services that it provides.” Domanski Dep. (Vol. 1) at 196.

### 11 III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

#### 12 A. Summary Judgment Standard.

13 Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as  
14 to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of  
16 material fact is on the party seeking summary judgment. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*,  
17 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). If the moving party satisfies their burden, the non-  
18 moving party may defeat summary judgment by identifying “specific facts  
19 showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*,  
20 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and  
21 all justifiable inferences are to be drawn” in favor of the non-movant. *Id.* at 255.

22 The party seeking summary judgment also must show that it is entitled to  
23 judgment as a matter of law. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322-23; *Western Chance #2, Inc.*  
24 *v. KFC Corp.*, 957 F.2d 1538, 1540 (9th Cir. 1992). The moving party is entitled  
25  
26



1 to judgment as a matter of law only when the non-moving party fails to make a  
2 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the moving party  
3 bears the burden of proof. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 323.  
4

5 **B. CERCLA Permits Recovery Of Damages For Tribal Service Loss.**

6 Teck’s sweeping assertion that “tribal service losses” are not recoverable  
7 under CERCLA is simply wrong. Service losses resulting from injury to natural  
8 resources are widely available to trustees such as the United States or a State and  
9 the result is no different when the trustee is a Tribe. Natural resource damages  
10 include the “compensable value of all or a portion of the services lost to the public  
11 for the time period from the discharge or release until the attainment of the  
12 restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent of  
13 baseline.” 43 C.F.R. § 11.80(b) (emphasis added); *see also* 43 C.F.R. §  
14 11.83(c)(1) (defining compensable value as “the amount of money required to  
15 compensate the public for the loss in services provided by the injured resources  
16 between the time of the discharge or release and the time the resources are fully  
17 returned to their baseline conditions, or until the resources are replaced and/or  
18 equivalent natural resources are acquired.”); *Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc.*,  
19 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122 n.22 (D. Idaho 2003) (courts grant due deference to  
20 DOI regulations). As a trustee, CCT has the same right to recover such losses as  
21 other trustees. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). Teck offers no interpretation of CERCLA  
22 supporting a distinction between a Tribe and the other trustees, nor does it offer  
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26

1 any decision from any court supporting this interpretation of CERCLA and there is  
2 none.<sup>6</sup>

3 Tribal service claims based on natural resource injury are a common part of  
4 settlements. Domanski Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; *see also, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez*, No. A89-  
5 095 CIV, 1993 WL 735037, \*3-4 (D. Alaska July 8, 1993) (noting that settlement  
6 provided government with “damages for loss of all public uses,” including both  
7 active use and nonuse) (emphasis in original). Damages to the cultural practices of  
8 Native American tribes as a result of the injured resources are commonly part of  
9 such settlements. *See* Domanski Decl. ¶ 9. Even Teck concedes that the  
10 Akwasasne, with Dr. Alfred’s help, recovered a multi-million dollar tribal service  
11 loss settlement. ECF 2777 at 9-10.

12 Although its motion is framed to target “tribal service loss,” its brief quickly  
13 shifts ground to target “cultural service loss.” Once again, it has no authority for its  
14 position and the regulations are to the contrary.

15 1. CERCLA permits recovery of use and nonuse service losses.

16 CERCLA NRD liability for damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of  
17 natural resources,” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C), includes “both **public use and**  
18 **nonuse values** such as existence and bequest values.” 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1)  
19  
20  
21

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22  
23  
24 <sup>6</sup> As explained below, the *Coeur d’Alene* case made a factual finding that no  
25 tribal service loss was proved but did not analyze the availability of such damages  
26 under CERCLA.

1 (emphasis added). “Nonuse value is the economic value the public derives from  
2 natural resources that is independent of any direct use of the services provided.”  
3 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1)(ii). Contrary to Teck’s assertion here, such damages are  
4 expressly contemplated by CERCLA itself. *State of Ohio v. U.S. Dept. of the*  
5 *Interior*, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that DOI’s failure to include  
6 damages for nonuse value in initial draft of implementing regulations “erroneously  
7 construe[s] the statute” and that CERCLA’s “command is expressly not limited to  
8 use value.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2)). Teck’s averment that CERCLA “does  
9 not permit such ‘loss of use’ or existence value claims,” ECF 2777 at 14 n.13, thus  
10 is flatly contradicted by the case law, including *State of Ohio* on which Teck  
11 elsewhere relies. 880 F.2d at 464 (“[E]xistence values may represent ‘passive’ use,  
12 but they nonetheless reflect utility derived by humans from a resource, and thus,  
13 prima facie, ought to be included in a damage assessment.”). This is no surprise,  
14 as DOI regulations expressly recognize that claims for such damages are  
15 cognizable under CERCLA. *See* 73 Fed. Reg. 57259, 57264 (acknowledging that  
16 nonuse values of “cultural, religious, and ceremonial losses that rise from the  
17 destruction of or injury to natural resources continue to be cognizable”).

21 2. Teck Misrepresents CERCLA’s Legislative History, Which Supports CCT.

22 Teck’s contention that a “cultural loss claim cannot be implied in the  
23 statute” because “Congress *rejected* an amendment in 1995 to allow the recovery  
24 of NRD for so-called non-use values,” ECF 2777 at 15 (internal quotations  
25 omitted, emphasis in original), is based on a wholesale misreading – whether  
26

1 intentional or inadvertent<sup>7</sup> – of the cited legislative history. The truth is directly  
2 contrary to Teck’s position: the proposed amendment at issue, which did not pass,  
3 was intended to **prohibit** recovery of nonuse values for natural resource damages  
4 under CERCLA. The bill at issue, H.R. 3000, would have amended 42 U.S.C. §  
5 9607(f) to **add** the following provision:  
6

7 **“(B) NONUSE VALUES. – There shall be no recovery under**  
8 **this Act based on non-use values.”**

9 H.R. 3000, 105th Cong. (1997) at 137 (emphasis added). By Teck’s own logic,  
10 such an amendment obviously would not have been necessary if CERCLA already  
11

12  
13 \_\_\_\_\_  
14 <sup>7</sup> The journal article relied upon by Teck – written by a then-associate  
15 attorney at a law firm touting its industry-side environmental practice – makes the  
16 same mischaracterization. See Sarah Peterman, *CERCLA’s Unrecoverable Natural*  
17 *Resource Damages: Injuries to Cultural Resources and Services*, 38 Ecology L.Q.  
18 (2011); FARELLA BRAUN & MARTEL OVERVIEW: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,  
19 <https://www.fbm.com/environmental-law/> (last visited October 26, 2023). In  
20 particular, the article mischaracterizes testimony by Representative Furse regarding  
21 tribal salmon ceremonies, claiming that such testimony was offered in support of  
22 an amendment she had proposed to “allow” damages for such losses, when in fact  
23 Representative Furse was questioning a proposed amendment to create a \$50  
24 million “cap” on natural resource damages. Compare 38 Ecology L.Q. (2011) with  
25 ECF 2777-2 at 401-03.  
26

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO TECK’S MPSJ ON TSL  
CLAIM- 20

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1 prohibited recovery of nonuse damages, as they now insist. To the contrary, such  
2 damages were (and are) plainly allowed.

3 Teck misleadingly quotes a truncated excerpt from the hearings on the  
4 proposed amendment, ECF 2777 at 15, to argue that the Congressional  
5 subcommittee considered and rejected an amendment to CERCLA to **allow**  
6 recovery of nonuse damages, when in fact the surrounding language – omitted in  
7 Teck’s brief – makes it clear that the amendment at issue would **bar** such recovery:  
8

9 I live, and I represent a district that heavily depends upon  
10 natural resources for economic viability. When these resources  
11 are damaged, my constituents experience a direct financial  
12 loss. If responsible parties are not to pay to fix the damage  
13 they’ve done, then the American taxpayer will have to pay  
14 instead. But they’ll have to pay not once, but twice.

15 In addition to those concerns, I want it noted, for the record,  
16 that I completely oppose **a prohibition on compensation for  
17 nonuse values**. These are the [aesthetic] cultural and religious  
18 values attached to natural resources that have been destroyed  
19 or damaged by toxic contaminants.

20 The National Congress of American Indians, as well as  
21 individual tribes including the Umatilla Tribe in my State of  
22 Oregon, have submitted testimony opposing **the elimination  
23 of nonuse value**.

24 *The Superfund Act, Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Finance and Hazardous*  
25 *Materials of the H. Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. at 24 (1998) (ECF 2777-3)*  
26 (bolded emphasis added; underlined portion quoted in Teck’s Motion at 15).

Teck’s assertion that CERCLA’s legislative history shows that a “cultural  
loss” cannot be recovered in connection with natural resource damages is simply  
false. The legislative history Teck has identified instead supports the opposite

1 conclusion: that nonuse damages **are** recoverable under the statute, and that  
2 Congress rejected an attempt to eliminate them. Such a reading is, of course,  
3 perfectly aligned with the holding in *State of Ohio*, for just as did the Department  
4 of Interior’s initial draft of CERCLA’s implementing regulations, Teck’s position  
5 that CERCLA does not provide for recovery of nonuse values “rests on an  
6 erroneous construction of the statute.” 880 F.2d at 464. The Court should reject  
7 Teck’s baffling attempt to turn the evidence of Congressional intent in passing  
8 CERCLA on its head.

9  
10 3. The Cases On Which Teck Relies Do Not Support Its Position.

11 In an effort to stitch together a categorical statutory bar on “tribal” or  
12 “cultural” losses where none exists, Teck relies on a handful of cases which do not  
13 support its position – much less compel summary judgment in its favor. In  
14 particular, Teck avers that the “only courts to speak squarely” on the question of  
15 tribal services “have rejected the concept,” ECF 2777 at 14-15, relying on the  
16 opinions in *Coeur d’Alene Tribe* 280 F. Supp. 2d 1101 and *In re Gold King Mine*  
17 *Release in San Juan County, Colorado, on August 5, 2015*, No. 1:18-md-02824-  
18 WJ and 16-cv-931-WJ-LF, 2023 WL 2914718 (D.N.M. Apr. 12, 2023). Teck,  
19 however, has distorted the holdings of these cases beyond their bounds, and neither  
20 supports the weight Teck would place upon it.

21  
22  
23 As an initial matter, the language of *Coeur d’Alene Tribe* quoted and bolded  
24 by Teck – that the “cultural uses of water and soil by the tribe are not recoverable  
25 as natural resource damages,” ECF 2777 at 14 – was (1) a finding of **fact**, not a  
26

1 conclusion of **law**; (2) entered after a 78-day trial involving hundreds of witnesses,  
2 not on a defense motion; and (3) not otherwise discussed in the opinion **at all**.<sup>8</sup>

3 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1101, 1107. The fact that the *Coeur d’Alene Tribe* court found  
4 based on the evidence presented at trial that the plaintiff could not recover a  
5 particular set of damages says absolutely nothing about what CERCLA does or  
6 does not permit and Teck does not quote any language from the opinion indicating  
7 otherwise. That Teck would seek to extrapolate a binding rule of law based on  
8 such a single finding, bereft of any explanation, reasoning, or even discussion of  
9 the relevant evidence, speaks volumes about the frailty of its legal position.<sup>9</sup>

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14 <sup>8</sup> The opinion’s only other reference to the plaintiff tribe’s “cultural”  
15 activities appears in the court’s analysis of whether the tribe was a “trustee” under  
16 the statute, something which is not at issue here. 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.

18 <sup>9</sup> Teck’s claim that the tribe in *Coeur d’Alene Tribe* “even sought damages  
19 for lost cultural uses of the same injured resources for which [they] sought NRD,”  
20 ECF 2777 at 14 n.13, appears to be nothing but speculation based on the court’s  
21 finding that evidence supported its finding that the release in question had caused  
22 injury to soils. 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. The court itself did not discuss any such  
23 connection. In any event, as discussed herein, CCT’s tribal service losses are  
24 based on an injury to natural resources despite Teck’s unsupported protestations to  
25 the contrary.  
26

1 Teck’s reliance on *In re Gold King Mine* fares no better. There, the  
2 defendant polluter sought dismissal at summary judgment of the plaintiff tribe’s  
3 state tort claims for cultural injury, arguing that such state law claims were  
4 preempted by CERCLA. 2023 WL 2914718 at \*5. The court rejected the  
5 defendant’s argument, holding that it “[had] not shown that the restorative  
6 programs damages claims are natural resource damages claims the recovery of  
7 which would be subject to the restriction that they be used only to restore, replace  
8 or acquire the equivalent of the damaged resource.” *Id.* at \*7. Notably, although  
9 the defendant “characterizes the [plaintiff’s] restorative damages claims as ‘natural  
10 resource damage’ claims, [it] also states “[the plaintiff] has not yet filed a claim for  
11 natural resource damages.” *Id.* Based on the evidence presented, the court  
12 concluded that the particular “restorative damages” sought by the plaintiff sought  
13 to remedy “injuries that are distinct from the injury to the River.” *Id.* Once again,  
14 far from announcing some rule of law regarding CERCLA’s scope or even  
15 “squarely” considering the issue of tribal service losses generally, *In re Gold King*  
16 *Mine* is an opinion based solely on the evidence before that court; it is confined to  
17 its facts, and of no guidance here.

21 In an attempt to discredit the Department of the Interior’s expressions of  
22 approval for tribal service loss claims, Teck also mischaracterizes the holding in  
23 *Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. DOI*, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Teck  
24 contends that when DOI’s commentary to its 1994 NRDA Rule stating that  
25 damages for “archaeological and other cultural services” could be recovered as  
26



1 natural resource damages “was challenged, the DC Circuit held the question was  
 2 unripe for review precisely *because* such commentary [in a preamble] ‘does not  
 3 represent an interpretation of an identified statutory provision, nor a clarification of  
 4 an otherwise binding regulation.’” ECF 2777 at 15-16 (emphasis in original). That  
 5 is false. Instead, *Kennecott* held that “reviewability [of a preamble] hinges upon  
 6 whether the preamble has independent legal effect, which in turn is a function of  
 7 the agency’s intention to bind either itself or regulated parties. Absent an express  
 8 statement to that effect, **we may yet infer that the agency intended the preamble**  
 9 **to be binding if what it requires is sufficiently clear.**” 88 F.3d at 1223  
 10 (emphasis added). The question was unripe, however, because the preamble  
 11 suggested only that a trustee “could” recover damages for cultural services:  
 12

14 The guidance offered is hypothetical and non-specific ...  
 15 Interior has merely advised that recovery could be available  
 16 for injury to non-natural resources, and illustrated one type of  
 17 injury that would qualify. For all we can tell, under the  
 18 preamble some consequential damages arising from an injury  
 19 to land may be per se non-recoverable; others may generally  
 20 be recoverable, but too remote to warrant recovery on the facts  
 21 of a specific case; still others may be reconcilable with the  
 22 statute and its regulations. In short, the Industry Petitioners  
 23 have not demonstrated that the 1994 preamble has a direct and  
 24 immediate rather than a distant and speculative impact upon  
 25 them ... [w]e must await a concrete case where we can probe  
 26 the limits of the rule in the context of a live controversy  
 involving actual events.

*Id.* In sum, *Kennecott* held that the issue of the preamble was unripe because the  
 petitioners could not show a live case or controversy – not because preambles are  
 unenforceable as a matter of law, as Teck would have this Court accept.

1 Accordingly, Teck’s request that this Court rule as a matter of law that  
2 CCT’s tribal service loss claims are unrecoverable under CERCLA runs directly  
3 contrary to CERCLA itself, its regulations, and its legislative history. There is no  
4 such bar to CCT’s recovery, and the cases on which Teck relies to effectively  
5 invent one are unavailing. The Court should deny Teck’s motion.  
6

7 **C. CCT’s Tribal Service Loss Claims Are Based On Teck’s Contamination**  
8 **of the UCR and Resulting Injury.**

9 Targeting CCT’s proposed Restoration Plan,<sup>10</sup> Teck argues that dismissal of  
10 CCT’s claimed tribal service losses is warranted because the claims are  
11 “disconnected from a specific, identified natural resource injury.” ECF 2777 at 16.  
12 As explained below, Teck is again wrong as a matter of law and fact.

13 1. CCT’s Claim Is Based On Injury To Natural Resources.

14 On this motion, Teck does not contest Plaintiffs’ proof that that Teck’s  
15 constant contamination of the UCR with toxic metals over a period of more than  
16

17 \_\_\_\_\_

18 <sup>10</sup> Teck does not address the Layton/Paterson contingent valuation study in  
19 connection with this argument, nor could it because the survey form answered by  
20 CCT members specifically describes one of the natural resource injuries in this  
21 case as the toxicity of Teck’s contamination to benthos. Nor does Teck apply this  
22 argument to Mr. Unsworth’s lost river use study either, because Mr. Unsworth  
23 calculated lost trips specifically linked to elevated mercury causing fish advisories.  
24 Thus, Teck’s motion must be denied even without consideration of its points on the  
25 Restoration Plan.  
26

1 eighty years – perhaps predictably – caused injury to natural resources. Such  
2 injuries include but are not limited to the destruction of habitat for benthic  
3 microinvertebrates and elevated mercury in fish. Domanski Decl. ¶ 12; SMF ¶  
4 105. This proof of injury is a predicate for liability. This is the point in 5  
5 Environmental Practice Guide §32B.05 (2023) (Michael B. Gerrard ed., Matthew  
6 Bender), cited by Teck. But, neither this treatise nor any other authority cited by  
7 Teck takes the next step to identify the scope of recoverable damages.  
8

9 Teck claims that, as a matter of law, lost services in the form of avoidance of  
10 the river are not recoverable because such loss was not connected to a resource  
11 injury. ECF 2777 at 20. On a motion for summary judgment, however, Teck  
12 cannot dispute CCT’s expert testimony demonstrating that CCT lost services in the  
13 form of disrupted cultural connection to the river as described by Drs. Domanski  
14 and Alfred, and CCT is entitled to all reasonable inferences therefrom. Dr.  
15 Domanski explained that Teck’s contamination of the UCR and the resultant  
16 damages to natural resources reduced the services provided by those resources to  
17 the public, and CCT in particular, while Dr. Alfred opined that Teck’s  
18 contamination of the UCR led CCT members to avoid engaging in practices that  
19 were central to the Tribes’ cultural life. *See* § II, ¶ 2, *supra*. Thus, CCT claims lost  
20 cultural services based on the actionable presence of Teck’s contaminants in the  
21 river. Domanski Dep. at 196-197. “It’s a cultural service injury that led to changes  
22 in behavior in connection with the river because of contamination in the river.” *Id.*  
23  
24  
25  
26

1 Teck offers no expert testimony to the contrary and offers only the arguments of  
2 lawyers; at best, this results only in disputed issues of fact.

3 Teck complains about this injury because it contends that CCT's avoidance  
4 of the river and resulting cultural loss is based on tribal members' "perceptions"  
5 ECF 2777 at 17. Of course, all human actions are based on our perceptions.  
6

7 Assuming that Teck means that CCT members' avoidance of the river is based on  
8 Teck's contamination of the river and not specifically the injury its contamination  
9 caused to benthos in the sediment, no caselaw either in CERCLA or general tort  
10 law allows a wrongdoer such an escape from the consequences of its wrongful  
11 acts. The wrongful act here was Teck's contamination of the resource leading to  
12 releases of hazardous substances to the environment of the UCR.  
13

14 Proof of damage must flow from the wrongful act, but it need not  
15 specifically tie to the actionable injury. For example, a claim for fear of developing  
16 a latent disease is compensable if that fear is reasonably related to an exposure and  
17 accompanied by a physical injury (caused by the tortfeasor's breach of a duty).  
18 See 50 A.L.R.4th 13 (1986). Consistent with this, in *Norfolk & Western Railway*  
19 *Company v. Ayers*, 538 U.S. 135, 140 (2003) the United States Supreme Court held  
20 that former railroad employees, who had developed asbestosis from asbestos  
21 exposure while working for the defendant railroad, could recover for their fear of  
22 developing cancer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Teck dumped its  
23 wastes in the UCR for decades, resulting in releases in the UCR, and on this  
24 motion Teck does not contest CCT's proof of cognizable injury, nor that its  
25  
26

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO TECK'S MPSJ ON TSL  
CLAIM- 28

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1 members avoid the river as a consequence. That proves a lost service and Teck has  
 2 no basis to refuse compensation for its acts.<sup>11</sup>

3 2. CERCLA authorizes recovery of lost services provided by an  
 4 uncontaminated UCR, including non-use and existence values.

5 Teck claims that CCT's damages based on the cost of its Restoration Plan  
 6 are not recoverable because they will not be spent on restoration of the injured  
 7 resource. Use of proceeds is not an element of an NRD claim. As explained now  
 8 multiple times, 43 C.F.R. §11.83 explains that "damages may include...the  
 9 compensable value of all or a portion of the services lost to the public..." Total  
 10 damages include "the costs of restoration and the value of all the lost uses of the  
 11 damaged resources...from the time of the release up to the time of restoration. *New*  
 12 *Mexico v. General Elec. Co.* 467 F. 3d 1223, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2006). CCT's  
 13 Restoration Plan does exactly that. Teck's complaints about CCT's use of a  
 14 damage award based on the Layton/Paterson stated preference study fare no better.  
 15 Such a form of damage calculation is recognized in the regulations without any  
 16 limitation on how the funds are spent. *See, e.g.*, 43 C.F.R. §11.83; *State of Ohio*,

17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21 <sup>11</sup> Teck's contention that CCT and its experts "admit" that the tribal service  
 22 loss claim reflects "a cultural injury, that exists independent of any actual injury to  
 23 a specific natural resource" illustrates the error in its analysis ECF 2777 at 17.  
 24 CCT's experts are clear in describing cultural loss resulting from contamination of  
 25 the river. *See* § II, ¶ 2, *supra*. Teck simply refuses to take responsibility for it,  
 26 much as it has refused responsibility since the outset of these proceedings.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO TECK'S MPSJ ON TSL  
 CLAIM- 29

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1 880 F.2d at 464. To be clear, CERCLA’s provisions governing use of NRD  
2 proceeds will guide use of any recovery in this case.

3 Even though its argument that use of funds is an element of the claim has no  
4 anchor in the statute or the regulations, Teck makes much of a statement by a CCT  
5 council person that she could not guarantee what a future council would do with a  
6 damage recovery in this case, but Ms. Marchand’s unwillingness to predict what a  
7 future council would do is only common sense. The same can be said for a current  
8 U.S. Senator’s prediction of what the next Senate will do – we cannot predict the  
9 future, but it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. Senate will act within the law.  
10 Teck also complains about how the CCT spent funds received in settlement of a  
11 different case. The settlement in question did not involve a CERCLA claim or any  
12 claim with restrictions on use of funds so it has no relevance here.

13  
14  
15 Teck also insists that the Restoration Plan is simply a “wish list of cultural  
16 revitalization programs that have nothing to do with restoring or replacing any  
17 injured public *natural resources*.” ECF 2777. Here, Teck forgets that natural  
18 resources includes the services they provide. *See supra* at § III.B. Even a cursory  
19 review of the evidence proffered by CCT’s experts proves Teck wrong. As  
20 explained by Dr. Domanski, the service losses caused by Teck’s harm to the  
21 natural resources included the loss of “practices that were central to the tribe’s  
22 cultural life including fishing, cultural contact, and ceremonial interactions with  
23 the UCR.” Domanski Decl. ¶¶ 14-16. The Restoration Program was developed to  
24 “mechanically replace components of lost cultural services associated with the  
25  
26

1 UCR.” *Id.* Teck is free to challenge whether it adequately does so at trial based on  
2 the evidence, but its febrile criticisms of CCT’s methodology here are not a basis  
3 for summary judgment.

4 **D. Teck Fails to Cite Any Standards Supporting its Position that**  
5 **Compliance with NRD Assessment regulations is Condition of Suit and**  
6 **CCT has Proffered evidence on CERCLA’s NRD elements**

7 Teck’s motion treats CCT’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 as if they are  
8 tested under the regulatory standards to obtain a rebuttable presumption for a  
9 natural resource damage assessment, not the statute itself. That is not the case and  
10 there is nothing else to Teck’s argument on this claim. Applying the elements of a  
11 NRD claim, CCT has ample evidence supporting the points Teck has targeted.

12 CCT has explained above that its claim for service losses is based on 42  
13 U.S.C. § 9607 (a), (f), and these provisions do not impose any standards such as  
14 scaling or baseline in their elements. These terms are taken from DOI regulations  
15 and they are not mandatory. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C); 43 C.F.R. § 11.10. Nor  
16 does any other provision of CERCLA require adherence to DOI regulations as a  
17 condition of suit. Thus, the regulations are not elements of the claim and cannot be  
18 standards against which a 9607(f) claim may be judged. Teck cites no authority to  
19 the contrary and there is none. Nor does Teck cite any other standards against  
20 which CCT’s service loss claim should be judged.  
21

22  
23 1. Scaling is not an Element of NRD Proof, but Plaintiffs’ Experts Nevertheless  
24 Applied Scaling Principles.

25 Teck claims that the “Restoration Plan is not in any way scaled or measured  
26 to the level of any natural resource injury—substantively or in its cost.” ECF 2777

1 at 23. This argument ignores the expert opinion of Dr. Domanski in which he  
2 explained that the cultural restoration plan is a type of “service-to-service scaling.”  
3 ECF 2679-24 (Domanski Report) at 109; Domanski Dep. (Vol. II) at 67. Teck  
4 ignores the substance of Dr. Domanski’s opinion and offers no counter opinion  
5 from its own expert, stating only that Dr. Domanski did not provide a  
6 “mathematical link” between measured contamination and the restoration package.  
7 But no such mathematical certainty is required, as Teck’s own authority makes  
8 clear. *See Garvin v. Greenbank*, 856 F. 2d 1392, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988) (damages  
9 need not be proven to a mathematical certainty; intelligent estimate without  
10 speculation and conjecture is sufficient). Dr. Domanski provided extensive analysis  
11 explaining that the restoration plan was scaled to injury from Teck’s  
12 contamination. Domanski Dep. at 67. Teck may disagree, but it has no expert  
13 testimony on point and, in any event, such a dispute must be resolved at trial.  
14

15  
16 Instead of taking up Dr. Domanski’s opinion, Teck bases its contention on  
17 the fact that the plan was developed independently of the work of proving releases  
18 of Teck’s hazardous substances and resulting injury to natural resources. ECF 2777  
19 at 20-21; SMF ¶ 62. Teck’s position is unavailing, for CCT’s approach was  
20 reasonable and proves nothing probative of the validity or effectiveness of the  
21 restoration plan. Indeed, Teck has no evidence on that subject, expert or otherwise,  
22 and has no basis for dispute. The history of development of the Restoration Plan is  
23 described above. Any criticisms of its development clash with expert opinion on its  
24 value and effectiveness and create only an issue for trial, at best.  
25  
26

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO TECK’S MPSJ ON TSL  
CLAIM- 32

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1 Teck’s complaint seems more directed at the nature of the injury to which  
2 the restoration plan responds. Teck cites Dr. Domanski’s explanation that “the  
3 cultural resource that is injured is persons’ connection with the river and series of  
4 cultural services that it provides.” ECF 2777 at 23. Given Teck’s confusion on  
5 this point, Dr. Domanski has provided a declaration explaining how economic  
6 principles are applied in this context. *See* Domanski Decl. ¶¶ 10-17; *see also supra*  
7 at § II, ¶ 2 (discussing applicable damage theory).

9 Teck goes on to argue that the Community Opinion Survey led by Dr.  
10 Domanski and others cannot validate the provisions of the restoration plan because  
11 it was done after the plan was created. Teck offers no explanation for this claim,  
12 and it has no basis. The survey confirms choices made in the restoration plan and is  
13 probative on that point. Domanski Dep. (Vol. II) at 21-25. Notably, Teck does not  
14 claim that the survey results are not consistent with the restoration choices.

16 Teck generally complains that the restoration plan would be helpful to the  
17 Tribes even if Teck had not released its metals at the site, but this does not  
18 persuade. That CCT cultural restoration may respond to other wounds as well does  
19 not undermine its value in responding to Teck’s contamination. Having said this,  
20 most of the CCT restoration plan targets specific consequences of Teck’s  
21 contamination. Monitoring will confirm water and sediment quality to enable  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

1 restoration of cultural connection of the river.<sup>12</sup> Slag removal will provide  
2 concrete evidence of improved river condition also responding to apprehension  
3 based on Teck’s contamination. Cultural programs and land acquisition enable  
4 cultural restoration and reconnection to the river, and they plainly respond to  
5 cultural disruption from Teck’s contamination.  
6

7 We observed earlier that Teck made no scaling argument concerning the  
8 work of Layton/Paterson or Mr. Unsworth. Such a claim would have been  
9 unavailing because provisions on scaling do not apply to compensatory damages.  
10 See 43 C.F.R. 11.83(c). Moreover, Mr. Unsworth explains that his methodology  
11 conformed to the regulations. Declaration of Robert Unsworth ¶¶ 2-5.  
12

13 2. Baseline is not a liability standard, but it was considered.

14 Teck’s arguments about baseline are also based in DOI regulations and have  
15 the same flaws as its scaling points addressed above. It is not an element of a 9607  
16 (a), (f) NRD claim and neither the statute nor any court indicates otherwise.  
17

18 Framed as a defense to the elements of the claim, Teck may contend that  
19 baseline is synonymous with proof that CCT’s damages were caused by Teck’s  
20 contamination. This is a fact intensive question that is rarely susceptible to  
21 summary judgment. This case is no exception because CCT has extensive evidence  
22

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23 <sup>12</sup> Teck claims that existing monitoring programs are sufficient citing  
24 websites. This was covered in the deposition of Whitney Fraser and she explained  
25 that existing programs did not provide the monitoring called for in the restoration  
26 plan. Fraser Dep. at 81-82, 247-49. Teck does not address Ms. Fraser’s testimony.

1 that its restoration plan responds to cultural loss due to Teck’s contamination and  
2 not other historical conditions such as the Grand Coulee Dam construction in the  
3 1940s, or the loss of the north half of the reservation in 1891. *See* ECF 2679-11  
4 (Alfred Report) and TSL Report; *see also* Domanski Dep. (Vol. II) at 75-77.

5  
6 Teck’s argument on “baseline” consists only identifying the various  
7 historical problems the CCT have confronted. Yes, the Grand Coulee Dam caused  
8 substantial cultural loss, the loss of the north half was damaging, and the CCT have  
9 had other challenges. None of that, however, gives Teck a free pass to dump its  
10 wastes in the UCR and argue, in effect, that the CCT have suffered so much injury  
11 that they cannot be hurt any more. It did not offer testimony from any expert with  
12 familiarity with CCT cultural issues and has no credible, competent basis to  
13 dispute the cultural loss CCT has proved.  
14

15 Dr. Alfred has explained that the Tribal Service Loss investigation targeted  
16 the consequence of Teck’s contamination. ECF 2679-11 (Alfred Report) at 3;  
17 Alfred Dep. at 206-08. And Teck did not attempt to prove otherwise. That Dr.  
18 Alfred did not investigate the impact of the Grand Coulee Dam is not surprising.  
19 He was focused on the injury at issue. That CCT has suffered other injuries, cannot  
20 be denied. But, the CCT TSL claim targets the impact of Teck’s contamination and  
21 not other—much earlier—injuries. To the extent Teck disagrees with Dr. Alfred,  
22 Dr. Domanski, or Ms. Fraser, all it has is a dispute of fact for trial.  
23

#### 24 **IV. CONCLUSION**

25 For the reasons stated herein, the Court should deny Teck’s Motion.  
26

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO TECK’S MPSJ ON TSL  
CLAIM- 35

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DATED this 31<sup>st</sup> day of October, 2023.

OGDEN MURPHY WALLACE, PLLC

By /s/ Paul J. Dayton

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PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO TECK'S MPSJ ON TSL  
CLAIM- 36

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on October 31, 2023, I caused the foregoing document to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System that in turn automatically generated a Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) to all parties in the case who are registered users of the CM/ECF system.

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DATED this 31<sup>st</sup> day of October, 2023.

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PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO TECK’S MPSJ ON TSL CLAIM- 37

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