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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**

THE TULALIP TRIBES OF  
WASHINGTON

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON;  
WASHINGTON STATE GAMBLING  
COMMISSION; CHRISTINE  
GREGOIRE, Governor of Washington, in  
her official capacity; and RICK DAY,  
Director of the Washington State  
Gambling Commission, in his official  
capacity.

Defendants.

Case No.: 2:12-CV-688-RAJ

**PLAINTIFF’S MOTION  
FOR SUMMARY  
JUDGMENT AND  
MEMORANDUM IN  
SUPPORT**

Note on Motion Calendar:

November 16, 2012

Oral Argument Requested

**I. INTRODUCTION**

This is a dispute between the Tulalip Tribes of Washington (“Tulalip” or “Tribe”), a federally recognized Indian tribe, and the State of Washington (“State”) regarding enforcement of a Tribal-State Gaming Compact pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2701, *et seq.*

1 Congress enacted IGRA in 1988 “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming  
2 by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and  
3 strong tribal governments.” *Id.* at § 2702(1). IGRA recognizes three classes of gaming. Slot  
4 machines, video lottery gaming devices and other lottery and casino-style games are Class III  
5 games. Under IGRA, a tribe may conduct Class III gaming activities only pursuant to a Tribal-  
6 State Compact negotiated between the tribe and the state within which the tribe’s land is located.  
7 *Id.* at § 2710 (d)(1)(C). Congress intended the IGRA tribal-state compacting process to reflect  
8 the negotiated interests of “two equal sovereigns.” *See* S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 13 (1988),  
9 *reprinted in* 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3083.

11 Among other matters, the Compact at issue here sets forth the terms on which the Tribe  
12 may conduct Class III gaming at the gaming facilities on its reservation. A “Most-Favored-  
13 Tribe” clause in the Compact sets forth a promise by the State in clear and unambiguous terms  
14 that “the Tribe shall be entitled” to certain “more favorable” compact terms to which the State  
15 agrees with another tribe. As shown below, the State has agreed to such more favorable terms  
16 with the Spokane Tribe, but has refused to extend those terms to Tulalip, thereby disavowing its  
17 Most-Favored-Tribe promise. The Tribe brings this suit because “Congress, in passing IGRA,  
18 did not create a mechanism whereby states can make empty promises to Indian tribes during  
19 good-faith negotiations of Tribal-State compacts, knowing that they may repudiate them . . .  
20 whenever it serves their purpose.” *Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson*, 124 F.3d 1050,  
21 1056 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997).

24 The Tribe seeks a declaration that the State is in violation of the Compact and an  
25 injunction to enforce it. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§  
26 1331 and 1362. The State has waived sovereign immunity to this suit by RCW § 9.46.36001 and

1 by Section 12 of the Compact. As explained below, there exists no genuine issue of material fact  
2 and the Tribe is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Tribe respectfully moves this Court  
3 for summary judgment in its favor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).

## 4 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

### 5 **A. The Tulalip Compact and the Tribal Lottery System**

6  
7 On August 2, 1991, the Tribe and State executed The Tribal-State Compact for Class III  
8 Gaming between the Tulalip Tribes of Washington and the State of Washington. *See*  
9 Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 1 (August 2, 1991 Tribal-State Compact (as amended)).<sup>1</sup> In  
10 November 1998, the Tribe and State executed an amendment to the Compact authorizing the  
11 Tribe to operate a Tribal Lottery System as part of its Class III gaming offerings. The  
12 amendment included an appendix (“Appendix X”) describing the Tribal Lottery System and  
13 setting forth the rules and other provisions governing its operation. *See id.* at Appendix X  
14 (fourth amendment). In 2007, the Tribe and State executed another amendment to the Compact,  
15 adding an additional appendix (“Appendix X2”) as a supplement to the Tribal Lottery System  
16 provisions of Appendix X. *See id.* at Appendix X2 (seventh amendment).

17  
18 The Tulalip Tribal Lottery System authorized by Appendices X and X2 operates within  
19 the Tribe’s two casino gaming facilities and utilizes stand-alone electronic Player Terminals with  
20 video displays that allow players to purchase chances to play “electronic scratch ticket lottery”  
21 games. In appearance and play, the Player Terminals resemble video slot machines.  
22

23  
24  
25 <sup>1</sup> The declarations of David Giampetroni and Douglas L. Bell (including all attachments)  
26 have been filed in both electronic and hard-copy format. Attachments 1 and 2 to the  
Giampetroni Declaration are large documents and the hard-copy versions of them are tabbed for  
ease of reference.

1 The Tribe began operation of its Tribal Lottery System in July of 1999. Since then, the  
2 Tribe's Lottery System has been vital to the Tribe's successful efforts to strengthen its tribal  
3 government and crucial to its ability to generate economic benefits for its members, surrounding  
4 communities and the State of Washington.

5  
6 **B. Player Terminal Allocation under the Compact and the TAP Procedure**

7 Section 12 of Appendix X2 sets forth the terms of the Tribe's allocation of Player  
8 Terminals for its Lottery System. Under that provision, the Tribe is authorized to operate a base  
9 allocation of 975 Player Terminals. The Compact gives the Tribe the right to increase that  
10 number, up to a maximum of 4,000 terminals across its two facilities, by purchasing additional  
11 terminal allocation rights from any Washington tribe that has entered into a compact authorizing  
12 the operation of a Tribal Lottery System ("Eligible Tribe"). *See id.* at Appendix X2 (seventh  
13 amendment) at §§ 12 – 12.2.2

14  
15 Section 12 of Appendix X2 requires that the Tribe obtain such additional allocation rights  
16 from other Eligible Tribes pursuant to a terminal allocation plan ("TAP") that sets forth the  
17 uniform requirements and limitations by which Eligible Tribes may enter agreements to transfer  
18 Player Terminal allocation rights. This procedure is hereafter referred to as the "TAP  
19 Procedure." *See id.* (seventh amendment) Appendix X2 at § 12.2.

20  
21 Under the TAP Procedure, Eligible Tribes that do not operate a Tribal Lottery System, or  
22 Eligible Tribes that do so utilizing less than their full base allocation of terminals, may transfer  
23 their unused allocation rights to a tribe such as Tulalip that wishes to operate a number of  
24 terminals in excess of its base allocation. The price for obtaining such rights is negotiated  
25 directly between the two tribes involved in the transaction.  
26

1 The present dispute between the State and Tribe concerns whether the Tribe is entitled to  
2 utilize a second mechanism, in addition to the TAP Procedure, by which it may obtain additional  
3 terminal allocation rights above its base allocation of 975 terminals.

#### 4 **C. The Compact's Most-Favored-Tribe Guarantee**

5 Sections 12.5 of Appendix X and 12.4 of Appendix X2 both include a Most-Favored-  
6 Tribe ("MFT") guarantee. Under those provisions, the State promised as follows:  
7

8 [I]n the event that the State agrees (or is required by law or a court ruling to  
9 agree) to permit an allocation of Player Terminals to a tribe which is greater, or is  
10 on terms which are more favorable, than as set forth herein, the Tribe shall be  
entitled to such greater Allocation or more favorable terms.

11 Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 1 (Tulalip Compact Appendix X (fourth amendment) § 12.5  
12 ("MFT") and Appendix X2 (seventh amendment) § 12.4 ("MFT")). This is the key Compact  
13 promise at issue in this suit.<sup>2</sup>

#### 14 **D. The Spokane Inter-Tribal Fund**

15 In 2007-08, the State and the Spokane Tribe entered into a Tribal-State Compact under  
16 IGRA that, as amended, includes provisions authorizing a Tribal Lottery System substantively  
17 identical to those authorized in the Tulalip Compact, as described above. *See* Giampetroni Dec.  
18 at Attachment 2 (Spokane Compact (as amended)). The Spokane Compact, like Tulalip's,  
19 permits the Spokane Tribe to operate a base allocation of up to 975 Player Terminals. *See id.*  
20 (first amendment) at Appendix X2 § 12.1. And like Tulalip's Compact, the Spokane Compact  
21 allows the Spokane Tribe to increase its Player Terminal allocation above 975 by recourse to the  
22 TAP Procedure, as described above. *See id.* at § 12.2.  
23  
24

25  
26 <sup>2</sup> Section 12.5 of Appendix X was subsequently amended to add reference to additional  
electronic gaming devices ("EGDs") not relevant to this dispute.

1           However, the Spokane Compact, unlike the Tulalip Compact, permits the Spokane Tribe  
2 to acquire Player Terminal allocation rights from other Eligible Tribes by a mechanism in  
3 addition to the TAP Procedure. Under the Spokane Compact, if the Spokane Tribe is unable to  
4 acquire additional allocation rights under the TAP Procedure after making reasonable efforts to  
5 do so, it may obtain such rights by making quarterly payments into an Inter-Tribal Fund (“ITF”).  
6 *See id.* (Appendix Spokane § 7). The payments are based on a set dollar amount per day for each  
7 Player Terminal above the Tribe’s base allocation. *See id.* at § 7(B). The monies in the ITF are  
8 distributed quarterly among Eligible Tribes by a formula set forth in Appendix Spokane. *See id.*  
9 at § 7(C).

10  
11           By contrast, under Tulalip’s Compact, Tulalip may acquire the rights to operate Player  
12 Terminals in excess of its base allocation only by acquiring those additional rights through the  
13 TAP Procedure. If Tulalip is unable to meet its Player Terminal needs by that procedure, the  
14 Compact provides no other means to meet those needs.

15           In sum, under the Spokane Compact, the Spokane Tribe may acquire rights to operate  
16 Player Terminals in excess of its base allocation by recourse to not one but *two* methods – (1) the  
17 TAP procedure, and (2) the Spokane ITF – while Tulalip has recourse only to the first of these  
18 methods under its existing Compact.

#### 19           **E. The State’s Disavowal of the Compact’s MFT Guarantee**

20  
21           On September 14, 2010, Tulalip notified the State that the allocation of player terminals  
22 provided for in the Spokane Compact – providing not one but two means to exceed the 975  
23 terminal base allocation – is on “terms which are more favorable” than those governing the  
24 “allocation of Player Terminals” set forth in the Tulalip Compact. Tulalip requested an  
25 amendment to the Compact to reflect the Tribe’s entitlement to the more favorable ITF terms.  
26 The Tribe invoked the MFT guarantees of Appendices X and X2 of the Compact, as well as

1 Section 15(d)(i) of the Compact, which permits the Compact to be amended by mutual  
2 agreement of the parties. *See* Bell Dec. at ¶¶ 1-3.

3 Representatives of the Tribe and State met several times between October 19, 2010 and  
4 August 10, 2011 to discuss the Tribe's desire to amend the Compact to include an ITF. The  
5 parties did not reach agreement. Throughout the process, the State insisted that it was not bound  
6 by the MFT guarantees to execute an amendment to the Tulalip Compact establishing an ITF  
7 based on the more favorable terms of the Spokane ITF. *See* Bell Dec. at ¶¶ 4-6.

8 On October 25, 2011, the Tribe invoked the Dispute Resolution procedures of Section  
9 12(b)(i-ii) of the Compact (Eighth Amendment). Pursuant to those procedures, the State and  
10 Tribe met several times and/or exchanged proposed draft amendments between October 25, 2011  
11 and February 29, 2012. Throughout that process, the State consistently refused to amend the  
12 Tulalip Compact to incorporate the more favorable ITF terms found in the Spokane Tribe's  
13 compact. *See* Bell Dec. at ¶¶ 7-8.

14 On January 17, 2012, the Tribe provided the State with a proposed Compact amendment  
15 including ITF terms tracking the more favorable ITF terms to which the State had agreed with  
16 the Spokane Tribe. That proposed amendment is included at Attachment 1 to the Complaint in  
17 this matter. *See* Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 3. The State refused to incorporate that  
18 proposed amendment into the Compact. *See* Bell Dec. at ¶¶ 9-10.

19 On February 29, 2012, the State presented the Tribe with a proposed amendment to the  
20 Tulalip Compact. That proposed amendment, which the State has attached to its Answer in this  
21 action, contained terms permitting Tulalip to operate an Inter-Tribal Fund. *See* Giampetroni  
22 Dec. at Attachment 4 (Attachment 1 to State's Answer to Complaint (Doc. No. 8-1)). However,  
23 the terms of the State's proposed ITF did not reflect the more favorable terms of the Spokane  
24  
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26

1 ITF. Instead, the State’s proposed ITF contained very significant limitations and restrictions not  
2 contained in the Spokane ITF. *See* Bell Dec. at ¶¶ 10-12.

### 3 **F. The Present Action**

4 The Compact provides that in the event the parties have engaged in dispute resolution  
5 under Section 12(b)(i-ii) of the Compact, and a party is dissatisfied with the results after 20 days  
6 have passed since original notice was given under section 12(b)(i), then it may initiate litigation  
7 in an appropriate United States district court seeking resolution of the dispute. *See* Giampetroni  
8 Dec. at Attachment 1 (Tulalip Compact (eighth amendment) § 12(d)). The Tribe filed this suit  
9 on April 20, 2012, more than 20 days after the Tribe’s notice to the State on October 25, 2011.  
10 Tulalip accordingly seeks a declaration that the State’s refusal to amend the Compact to reflect  
11 Tulalip’s entitlement to the “more favorable terms” of the Spokane ITF constitutes a breach of  
12 the MFT guarantees in the Compact. The Tribe also seeks an injunction requiring the State to  
13 execute an amendment to the Compact to incorporate the more favorable Player Terminal  
14 allocation terms of the Spokane ITF as reflected in Attachment 3 to the Declaration of  
15 Giampetroni.  
16

## 17 **III. ARGUMENT**

### 18 **A. Summary Judgment Standard**

19 Summary judgment is appropriate if there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the  
20 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). Courts view  
21 disputed facts favorable to the non-movant and grant summary judgment if disputed material  
22 facts viewed in this manner, coupled with the undisputed material facts, establish that the moving  
23 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc.*, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134  
24 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). “A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly  
25 probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact. . . . There must be enough doubt for a  
26



1 ‘reasonable trier of fact’ to find for [the non movant] in order to defeat the summary judgment  
 2 motion.” *Id.* (citations omitted). Courts deciding a summary judgment motion defer to neither  
 3 party in resolving purely legal questions. *See Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co.*, 185 F.3d 939, 942  
 4 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999).

5 **B. There are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact**

6 “A ‘material’ fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose  
 7 existence might affect the outcome of the suit.” *T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors*  
 8 *Ass’n*, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, there are only three material facts, and all are  
 9 undisputed:  
 10

11 1. The parties agreed to the terms of the Compact, including the terms of Appendix X and  
 12 X2, which include the following guarantee:

13 [I]n the event that the State agrees (or is required by law or a court ruling to agree) to  
 14 permit an allocation of Player Terminals to a tribe which is greater, or is on terms  
 15 which are more favorable, than as set forth herein, the Tribe shall be entitled to such  
 16 greater Allocation or more favorable terms.

17 *See Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 1 (Appendix X (fourth amendment) at §12.5 and Appendix*  
 18 *X2 (seventh amendment) at § 12.4). This fact is undisputed. See Complaint at ¶ 26; Answer at ¶*  
 19 *26;*

20 2. The State has entered into a compact with the Spokane Tribe that contains terms  
 21 governing the Spokane Tribe’s allocation of lottery Player Terminals that include a second  
 22 method by which the Spokane Tribe may acquire such terminals that is not present in the Tulalip  
 23 Compact. *See Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 2 (Appendix Spokane §7). This fact is also*  
 24 *undisputed. See Complaint at ¶¶ 28-30; Answer ¶¶ 28-30; and*  
 25

1 3. The State has refused to incorporate into the Tulalip Compact without additional  
2 restrictions the terms of the Spokane Compact providing for a second method to acquire  
3 additional terminals. This fact is also undisputed. *See* Bell Dec. at ¶¶ 10-12; Giampetroni Dec. at  
4 Attachment 4 (Attachment 1 to State’s Answer to Complaint (Doc. No. 8-1)).

5  
6 The issues in this suit are accordingly limited to questions of law; namely, the  
7 interpretation of the MFT language in Tulalip’s Compact and the terminal allocation provisions  
8 to which the State has agreed with Tulalip and the Spokane Tribe. *See* Combined Joint Status  
9 Report and Discovery Plan (Doc. No. 9) at 3 (“The parties view this case as a dispute primarily  
10 over the meaning of contractual and/or statutory language”). Therefore, there exists no genuine  
11 issue of material fact. As demonstrated next, Tulalip is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

### 12 **C. Tulalip is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law**

#### 13 **1. Principles of Compact Interpretation**

14  
15 In the Ninth Circuit, Tribal-State Class III gaming compacts entered pursuant to IGRA  
16 are governed by federal law and subject to applicable principles of contract interpretation. *Idaho*  
17 *v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes*, 465 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). State law rules of contract  
18 interpretation of the state in which the compact was formed are applicable if those rules are  
19 consistent with federal common law. *Id.* The Tribe discerns no relevant difference between  
20 Washington and federal law in terms of the relevant general principles of contract interpretation.

21  
22 In Washington, “the touchstone of the interpretation of contracts is the intent of the  
23 parties.” *Contractors Equip. Maintenance Co. v. Bechtel Hanford, Inc.*, 514 F.3d 899, 904 (9<sup>th</sup>  
24 Cir. 2008) (quoting *Scott Galvanizing, Inc. v. Nw. EnviroServices, Inc.*, 844 P.2d 428, 432  
25 (1993). The parties’ intent is “‘determined from the actual words used.’” *Id.* (quoting *Hearst*  
26 *Communications, Inc. v. Seattle Times, Co.*, 115 P.3d 262, 267 (2005)). Courts impute to the

1 parties an intention that corresponds with the plain, ordinary and reasonable meaning of the  
2 words used in the contract unless the entirety of the contract clearly demonstrates a contrary  
3 intent. *Hearst*, 115 P.2d at 267. Finally, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if a contract is  
4 unambiguous[.]” *BP Land & Cattle LLC v. Balcom & Moe, Inc.*, 86 P.3d 788 (Wash. App.  
5 2004). A contract provision is not ambiguous simply because the parties suggest opposing  
6 meanings, and courts do not read ambiguity into a contract where it can reasonably be avoided.  
7 *Mayer v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc.*, 909 P.2d 1323 (Wash. App. 1995).

8  
9 2. The Most-Favored-Tribe Language is Unambiguous

10 The MFT provisions at issue in this case are unambiguous. The MFTs in both Section  
11 12.5 of Appendix X and Section 12.4 of Appendix X2 provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

- 12
- 13 • In the event that the State agrees
  - 14 • to permit an allocation of Player Terminals to a tribe
  - 15 • which . . . is on terms which are more favorable, than as set forth herein,
  - 16 • the Tribe shall be entitled to such . . . more favorable terms.
  - 17

18 There is no reasonable interpretation of this language other than that the parties intended  
19 Tulalip to enjoy the benefit of any terms pertaining to Player Terminal allocation agreed to  
20 between the State and another tribe that are more favorable than the terms pertaining to Player  
21 Terminal allocation contained in the Tulalip Compact. The sole remaining question, then, is  
22 whether the terminal allocation terms creating an Inter-Tribal Fund to which the State agreed  
23 with the Spokane Tribe are “more favorable” than those contained in the Tulalip Compact.  
24 Again, as discussed below, the Compact provisions are unambiguous in this regard.  
25  
26

1           3. The State Agreed to “More Favorable” Terminal Allocation Terms with the  
2           Spokane Tribe

3           Section 12 of Appendix X2 to the Tulalip Compact governs lottery Player Terminal  
4 acquisition and operation. *See* Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 1 (Tulalip Compact Appendix  
5 X2 (seventh amendment) § 12). Subsection 12.1 establishes that the Tribe may operate up to an  
6 initial allocation of 975 Player Terminals. Subsection 12.2 is entitled “Further Conditions” and  
7 sets forth the terms under which the Tribe may increase its allocation of Player Terminals above  
8 its initial allocation of 975. As described above, the Tribe may do so by purchasing allocation  
9 rights from another Eligible Tribe pursuant to a Terminal Allocation Plan that a majority of  
10 Eligible Tribes have approved and had an opportunity to participate in formulating. *See*  
11 Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 1 (Tulalip Compact Appendix X2 (seventh amendment) §§ 12.2  
12 and 12.2.2. Those provisions, as noted, establish the “TAP Procedure.” The TAP Procedure is  
13 the sole means under the Compact by which the Tulalip Tribe may increase its allocation of  
14 Player Terminals above its base allocation of 975.

15           The Spokane Tribe is also a signatory to Appendix X2, and therefore also benefits from  
16 the TAP Procedure set forth in Sections 12.2 and 12.2.2 of Appendix X2. *See* Giampetroni Dec.  
17 at Attachment 2 (Spokane Compact (first amendment) Appendix X2 at §§ 12.1 and 12.2-12.2.2).  
18 However, the TAP Procedure is not the sole means by which the Spokane Tribe can exceed its  
19 base allocation of 975 terminals. In Appendix Spokane the State agreed to permit the Spokane  
20 Tribe to utilize an additional means to acquire Player Terminals above its base allocation.  
21

22           Both Spokane and Tulalip are limited to a base allocation of 975 Player Terminals, and  
23 they may increase that number by recourse to the TAP Procedure. But under the Spokane  
24 Compact, the Spokane Tribe may also increase that number via recourse to the ITF should it be  
25  
26

1 unable to obtain additional terminals via the TAP Procedure. By contrast, if the Tulalip Tribe is  
 2 unable to obtain additional terminal allocation rights via the TAP Procedure, it has no other  
 3 recourse under its Compact to acquire them.

4 Terminal allocation rights are beneficial rights. It is self-evident that in a finite and  
 5 competitive market for such rights, having access to a second feasible means to obtain them, as  
 6 provided by the Spokane ITF, is more favorable than having just one such means, as provided in  
 7 the Tulalip Compact. In agreeing to an ITF with the Spokane Tribe, the State has agreed to a  
 8 terminal allocation “on terms which are more favorable” than those contained in the Tulalip  
 9 Compact. Accordingly, under the unambiguous MFT language in both Section 12.5 of Appendix  
 10 X and Section 12.4 of Appendix X2, Tulalip “shall be entitled to such . . . more favorable terms.”

11  
 12  
 13 4. The Tribe’s Proposed Amendment Reflects its MFT Rights

14 Attachment 3 to the Giampetroni Declaration is the Tribe’s proposed amendment to the  
 15 Tulalip Compact establishing a Tulalip Inter-Tribal Fund, which Tulalip provided to the State on  
 16 January 17, 2012.<sup>3</sup> The operational terms of Tulalip’s proposed ITF are set forth in section  
 17 12.2.5.2 of that document and are drawn substantively verbatim from the more favorable  
 18 operational terms of the Inter-Tribal Fund to which the State agreed with the Spokane Tribe.  
 19 *Compare* Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 3 at § 12.2.5.2 (“Inter-Tribal Fund”) *with* Attachment  
 20 2 (Appendix Spokane, § 7 (“Inter-Tribal Fund”)).

21  
 22 The Spokane Compact includes certain numeric limitations and other restrictions on  
 23 Player Terminals (unrelated to the operation of the ITF) that are not included in Tulalip’s  
 24 proposed amendment. *See, e.g.*, Giampetroni Dec. at Attachment 2 (Appendix Spokane at §

25  
 26 <sup>3</sup> Attachment 3 to the Declaration of Giampetroni is included as Attachment 1 to Tulalip’s Complaint.

1 6(B)) (requiring renegotiation of Player Terminal provisions on third anniversary of compact and  
2 limiting Player Terminal operation during renegotiation period). However, Tulalip is not  
3 required to accept such unfavorable restrictions under the MFT. The plain and unambiguous  
4 language of Tulalip's entitlement to "such . . . *more favorable* terms" does not reasonably  
5 encompass a concomitant obligation to also accept *unfavorable* terms from another tribe's  
6 compact. *See, e.g., Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes*, 465 F.3d 1095, 1100-1102 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
7 2006) (granting summary judgment for Tribe and rejecting argument by State that most-favored  
8 compact provision entitling Tribe to operate "those same additional games" (if subsequently  
9 authorized in other tribes' compacts) could be read to include numeric and other restrictions on  
10 those games agreed to by the other tribes as a condition of being authorized to operate them).

11  
12 Nor is Tulalip required to accept the unfavorable restrictions contained in the State's  
13 proposed amendment attached to its Answer. For example, under the State's proposal, Tulalip's  
14 access to its ITF and the price it must pay per terminal are both contingent upon the approval or  
15 disapproval of a majority of Eligible Tribes. *See* Attachment 1 to State's Answer at §§ 12.2.2  
16 and 12.2.5.1(b). In other words, the State has proposed an ITF for Tulalip subject to the veto  
17 power of other tribes. No such restriction is imposed on Spokane's access to its ITF and Tulalip  
18 is not required to accept such restrictions in its own. *See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes*, 465 F.3d at  
19 1100-1102. The State's proposed amendment contains numerous other unfavorable limitations  
20 and restrictions that clearly do not fall within the plain meaning of the MFTs' unambiguous  
21 promise of "more favorable terms." *See* Dec. of Bell at ¶¶ 10-12.

22  
23  
24 In sum, the State promised Tulalip that "in the event that the State agrees . . . to permit an  
25 allocation of Player Terminals to a tribe which . . . is on terms which are more favorable than as  
26 set forth herein, the Tribe shall be entitled to such . . . more favorable terms." Giampetroni Dec.

1 at Attachment 1 (Tulalip Compact at § 12.5 of Appendix X and § 12.4 of Appendix X2). The  
2 State agreed to such more favorable terms with the Spokane Tribe. Tulalip's proposed  
3 amendment precisely reflects its contractual entitlement under the MFTs to those more favorable  
4 terms. Tulalip is accordingly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

5  
6 **D. Conclusion**

7 For the foregoing reasons, the Tribe respectfully requests a declaration that the State is in  
8 violation of the Compact and an injunction requiring the State to execute an amendment with  
9 Tulalip incorporating into the Tulalip Compact the terms of Attachment 1 to the Tribe's  
10 Complaint.

11  
12  
13 Respectfully submitted,

14 Dated: October 25, 2012.

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23  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 25, 2012, I electronically filed this Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice of the filing to all parties registered in the CM/ECF system for this matter.

KANJI & KATZEN, PLLC

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