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¹ Plaintiffs again failed to comply with Title 10, Section 10.05.050(e). They did not file their Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt six court days before the date of the hearing, and they failed to "make reasonable, good faith efforts to coordinate with the opposing party or his advocate, if he has one, prior to scheduling a hearing." Title 10, § 10.05.050(e)(1). Defendants object to Plaintiffs' continued disregard of the Nooksack Court rules.

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I. FACT STATEMENT

On December 3, 2013, the Tribal Council passed Resolution No. 13-171, which provided Christmas Support funds to Nooksack Tribal members in the amount of \$250. Decl. of M. Roberts, Exh B. The written resolution mistakenly omitted language requested by the Tribal Council that authorized later payments to Plaintiffs if their enrollment appeals are successfully concluded. Decl. of A. Smith ¶¶5, 10. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and Motion for TRO on December 9. Compl. 1; Mot. for TRO 1. On December 13, 2013, the Council superseded Resolution No. 13-171 through passage of Resolution No. 13-181. See Defs.' Resp. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for TRO (Opp'n to TRO), Exh. A, Resolution 13-181. On December 18, 2013, this Court issued an Order Granting on Motion for TRO. The Nooksack Tribal Accounting Department did not prepare any Christmas Support checks on December 19, 2013. Decl. of E. Ames ¶9. The Nooksack Tribal Accounting Department reissued seven Christmas Support checks on December 20, 2013, to replace seven Christmas Support checks that were initially sent on or about December 12, 2013. Decl. of E. Ames ¶10; Decl. of A. Smith ¶11; Decl. of F. Leyva ¶8-9. These replacement checks were reissued due to the original checks being mailed to an incorrect address or containing an incorrect name. Decl. of A. Smith ¶11; Decl. of F. Leyva ¶8. None of the Plaintiffs were in the same position as those members who received a reissued check. Decl. of A. Smith ¶11(e); Decl. of F. Leyva ¶8(e).

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

Defendants are immune from suit, the Tribe has not waived sovereign immunity, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case. While this suit is brought against certain individuals it is the Tribal Council's official actions that aggrieve Plaintiffs. Defendant officials have not violated this Court's Order of December 18, 2013. Plaintiffs' claims regarding Resolution No.

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13-171 became moot when that Resolution was superseded on December 13, 2013.

A. Defendants are Immune from Suit and This Court Lacks Jurisdiction.

This Court lacks jurisdiction because the Nooksack Indian Tribe, the Council, and tribal officials are immune from suit. Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, compensatory civil contempt proceedings that would impact the public treasury cannot continue. Coleman v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1184, 1189-92 (8th Cir. 1993).² An Indian tribe is immune from suit because it is a sovereign entity with common law immunity. Cline v. Cunanan, Case No. NOO-CIV-02/08-5, 5-6 (Nooksack Ct. App. 2009); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Sovereign immunity acts as a jurisdictional bar to bringing suits against tribes unless Congress has authorized the lawsuit or a tribe has waived its immunity. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58-59: Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). Waivers of immunity must be clear, express, unequivocal, and cannot be implied. Olson v. Nooksack, 6 NICS App. 49, 52-53 (Nooksack Ct. App. 2001) (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60). Sovereign immunity also applies to tribal officials and employees acting within the scope of their authority. Cline, Case No. NOO-CIV-02-08-5, at 6 (citing Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987)); see also Mitchell v. Pequette, CV-07-38, 2008 WL 8567012 at *7-9 (Leech Lake Tribal Court May 9, 2008) (holding that tribal employees retained

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT - Page 3

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² Plaintiffs cite a Tulalip Tribal Court decision for the proposition that sovereign immunity does not bar a contempt holding against Defendants, but that decision, *T.S. v. Tulalip Tribes*, No. TUL-CV-ET-2012-0478 (Tulalip Tribal Ct. Apr. 9, 2013), was vacated and expunged from the record by *T.S. v. Tulalip Tribes*, No. TUL-CV-ET-2012-0478, Order on Joint Motion to Vacate Order and Memorandum in Support (Tulalip Tribal Ct. May 2, 2013) (attached as Exh. A). The federal cases cited by Plaintiffs do not concern contempt proceedings at all. *See* Mot. for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt 4:23 – 5:3. Plaintiffs fail to cite any case that would allow this Court to order the expenditure of tribal funds.

³ Generally, federal courts lack jurisdiction over the decisions of an Indian tribe to disenroll any of its members. *See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978); *Jeffredo v. Macarro*, 599 F.3d 913, 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2010); *Lewis v. Norton*, 424 F.3d 959, 960 (9th Cir. 2005).

sovereign immunity even though the plaintiff alleged that the employees acted outside the scope of their authority, because the plaintiff failed to legally or factually support this allegation).

Tribal sovereign immunity "extends to actions brought against tribes in tribal court." Olson, 6

NICS App. at 51.

In the *Cline* case, the plaintiff-appellants sued the Council Chairman and the Council for declaratory relief and damages based on allegations of civil rights violations and a challenge to the Nooksack Tribal Election Ordinance. *Cline*, Case No. NOO-CIV-02-08-5, at 1. The Nooksack Court of Appeals found that the appellees retained sovereign immunity even though the complaint named individual officers. *Id.* at 7. Importantly the Court found that, "[t]he Nooksack Tribal Council and its officers need to be able to enact ordinances and conduct business without constantly having to defend themselves against suit."

The Nooksack Constitution entrusts the Council with the authority to establish the Tribal Court by ordinance. *Const.*, art. VI, § 2(A)(1). Article VI, § 2(A)(3) of the Constitution provides that the Tribal Court shall have jurisdiction "over all matters concerning the establishment and functions of tribal government, provided that nothing herein shall be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity by the tribal government." Under this jurisdictional provision, a suit against the Tribal Government and the Council can only proceed when there is an express waiver of sovereign immunity. *Cline*, Case No. NOO-CIV-02/08-5, at 6.

The Council acted upon its constitutional authority to establish a tribal court by ordinance when it adopted Title 10—the Nooksack Indian Tribe's Tribal Court System and Court Rules.

The Tribal Court has limited civil and criminal subject matter jurisdiction only as to matters "specifically enumerated in the Nooksack Code of Laws. Title 10, § 10.00.030. Title 10, § 10.00.050 provides for exclusive, original jurisdiction in the Tribal Court in any matter where the Tribe or its officers and employees are parties in their official capacities, but this jurisdiction

is limited by the following sentence:

Nothing contained in the preceding sentence or elsewhere in this Code shall be construed as a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Tribe or its officers or enterprises unless specifically denominated as such and the court is expressly prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over the Nooksack Indian Tribe without and [sic] express wavier [sic] of sovereign immunity.

Title 10, § 10.00.050. Title 10 contains an additional provision explaining that nothing in Title 10 or any other law waives the Tribe's, its officials', its entities', or its employees' immunity without an express waiver enacted by the Council. Title 10, § 10.00.100. In addition, Title 10 limits the remedies in a suit against the Tribe's agent or employee to declaratory and prospective injunctive relief. Title 10, § 10.00100(b). Neither Congress⁴ nor the Council has expressly waived the Tribe's sovereign immunity, as required under the Constitution, Title 10, and federal law. Plaintiffs cannot use a contempt motion to obtain relief that is barred by federal and tribal law.

B. Defendants Have Complied with the Court's December 18, 2013 Order.

In order to find a party in civil contempt, the "moving party has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a specific and definite order of the court." *F.T.C. v. Affordable Media*, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). To avoid mistaken violations, injunctions must "describe in reasonable detail ... the acts restrained or required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(C). Such an injunction binds the parties and other persons in active concert with them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). Upon such a showing, the "burden then shifts to the contemnors to demonstrate why they were unable to comply." *F.T.C.*, 179 F.3d at 1239. Here, Plaintiffs have not put forth any evidence showing Defendants have violated the Court's December 18, 2013 Order; rather, they have made conclusory and incorrect statements of

⁴ Inclusion of the Indian Civil Rights Act in the Constitution does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. *Cline*, Case No. NOO-CIV-02/08-5, at 6; *Martinez*, 436 U.S. at 58-73; *Gallegos v. Jicarilla Apache Nation*, 97 F. App'x 806, 811 (10th Cir. 2003).

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violation. See Mot. for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt 5:24 - 6:3. The Court's Order stated:

Therefore, the Court finds that, at this preliminary TRO stage in this matter, the Defendants have violated the Nooksack Indian Tribe's Constitution, Article IX and the Equal Protection clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act in passing Resolution 13-171 and acting upon it. The Court orders that the Defendants be enjoined from treating the proposed disenrollees differently from other tribal members with respect to the Christmas Support distribution. However, the Court finds that the Court cannot order specific relief requiring the expenditure of tribal funds.

Order Granting on Mot. for TRO 13:2-7.

Resolution No. 13-181 completely superseded Resolution No. 13-171 such that Resolution No. 13-171 has not had any effect since December 13, 2013. See Opp'n to TRO, Exh. A. Defendants have not acted under Resolution No. 13-171 since it was superseded on December 13, 2013. See Decl. of E. Ames ¶10(b).

This Court's December 18, 2013 Order only and preliminarily found that Resolution No. 13-171 violated the law, but the Order did not conclude that Resolution No. 13-181 violated any law. See Order Granting on Mot. for TRO. The Court explicitly distinguished action under Resolution No. 13-171 from the Back to School Support action in the Roberts case based on the "carve out," which allows a member subject to pending disenrollment proceedings to obtain the discretionary funds upon a decision by the Tribal Council that such a member will remain enrolled. Order Granting on Mot. for TRO 9:6-14. Resolution No. 13-181 contains the same "carve out" present in the Roberts Back to School Support Resolution. See Opp'n to TRO, Exh. A. The fact that the "carve out" was erroneously omitted⁵ from Resolution No. 13-171 does not

⁵ The Tribal Council had requested that Resolution No. 13-171 contain the "carve out" language included in the Back to School Support Resolution, and the Council believed that Resolution No. 13-171 contained this language upon passing it. Decl. of A. Smith ¶¶ 5, 10. Unfortunately, the language was inadvertently omitted, and as soon as the Council became aware of this omission, the Council passed Resolution No. 13-181, which superseded Resolution No. 13-171 and included the "carve out" language. See Decl. of A. Smith ¶10.

impact whether any member subject to pending disenrollment proceedings will be able to receive Christmas Support funds. Plaintiffs suffered no harm during the days prior to the correction of Resolution No. 13-171 by No. 13-181. Plaintiffs are in the exact same position with respect to Christmas Support funds now as they were in with respect to the Back to School Support funds in the *Roberts* case.⁶

The Court stated, however, that "[w]hile 13-181 appears to carve out a means by which the proposed disenrollees could access the Christmas Support, the fact remains that the Christmas Support check distribution took place under the authority of Resolution 13-171 and 13-181 does not, at least in the Court's preliminary view, fix that." Order Granting on Mot. for TRO 9:11-14. Defendants are troubled by this sentence and do not understand the Court's language, particularly because the "carve out" included in Resolution No. 13-181 was approved by this Court in *Roberts*, and similar "carve outs" have been used widely in analogous cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit and District Court for the Southern District of California approved of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Memorandum Order allowing the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians to place per capita distributions for members subject to disenrollment proceedings in an escrow account pending a final membership determination. *Alto v. Black*, 12-56145, 2013 WL 6813816, at *4-7 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2013); *see also Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335-41; *Ass'n for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles*, 648 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2011) (the plaintiffs were suspended without a hearing when it was confirmed that they had been charged with a

⁶ This Court properly upheld the Back to School Support funds in the *Roberts* case, as delaying benefits once eligibility is challenged has been found to be constitutional by the federal Supreme Court. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335-41 (1976) (finding that a disability benefits recipient whose benefits were terminated after an eligibility challenge was afforded due process even though there was no pre-termination hearing, because full retroactive relief would be provided if the recipient ultimately prevailed); *see also Gary v. Nichols*, 447 F. Supp. 320, 325 (D. Idaho 1978).

felony, and Due Process only required post-suspension hearings); *Gary v. Nichols*, 447 F. Supp. 320, 325 (D. Idaho 1978).

Plaintiffs falsely allege that, on December 19 and 20, Defendants directed the Accounting Department to issue approximately 20 Christmas Support checks. *See* Mot. for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt 5:24 – 6:1; Decl. of L. Zapata ¶¶ 9-10. Defendants did not give any directives regarding Christmas Support funds after the Court's December 18, 2013 Order. Decl. of A. Smith ¶13; Decl. of E. Ames ¶¶5(f), 7; Decl. of E. King George ¶4(f); Decl. of F. Leyva ¶6. Thus Defendants did not violate this Court's Order.

Ms. Zapata, an aggrieved former employee, was not fully aware of the situation and is wrong about many details. Decl. of E. Ames ¶¶5, 8(b)10. The Accounting Department reissued seven Christmas Support checks on December 20, 2013, because the original checks sent on or about December 12, 2013, were mailed to an incorrect address or contained incorrect information and were not cashed. See Decl. of A. Smith ¶11; Decl. of E. Ames ¶10; Decl. of F. Leyva ¶¶8-9. These reissued checks were not new Christmas Support checks; rather normal Accounting Department practice led tribal employees to simply replace checks that were issued prior to the Court's December 18, 2013 Order. No Plaintiff was in a similar situation due to missing or incorrect check information. See Decl. of A. Smith ¶11(e); Decl. of F. Leyva ¶8(e). Additionally, these reissued checks were sent under the authority of Resolution No. 13-181—the only operative Resolution concerning Christmas Support checks on December 20, 2013. Resolution No. 13-181 has not been found to violate the law, which means that even if Defendants had directed the reissuance of seven Christmas Support checks on December 20. 2013—which they did not—any such action would not have violated a specific requirement of this Court's Order. See Order Granting on Mot. for TRO. Defendants have complied with this Court's Order; there can be no finding of contempt.

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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT - Page 9

2013 HAY -2 AH 10:51
TULALIP TRIBAL COURT
CLERK POR

IN AND FOR THE TULALIP TRIBAL EMPLOYMENT COURT TULALIP, WASHINGTON

T.S., Appellant
v. No. TUL-CV-ET-2012-0478

Tulalip Tribes, Respondent

JOINT MOTION TO VACATE ORDER

AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

[Proposed Order Attached]

TO: TULALIP EMPLOYMENT COURT;

THE HONORABLE JUDGE BROWN

CLERK OF THE TULALIP TRIBAL COURT;

JOINT MOTION TO VACATE

COME NOW Appellant, T.S., and Respondent, Tulalip Tribes, jointly, and move the Court to VACATE the order entered in this matter on April 9, 2013, entitled *Findings, Conclusions and Order re Contempt of the Court's November 7, 2012 Order*, on the ground that the parties have reached a settlement agreement that renders this matter moot upon entry of the subjoined proposed order; and as further grounds for vacating said Order the parties respectfully represent to this honorable Court as follows:

JOINT MOTION TO VACATE - 1

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ORIGINAL

Exhibit A

I. THE PARTIES JOINTLY REQUEST THE COURT VACATE THE APRIL 9, 2013 FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND ORDER RE CONTEMPT OF THE COURT'S NOVEMBER 7, 2012 ORDER.

The above-referenced parties seek this Court's assistance in their efforts to amicably settle the pending issues in this action and its related matters. The parties do not lightly make this request of the Court, but do so after careful consideration and discussion. The parties have reached a global settlement agreement that is contingent upon the Court granting this request and executing the subjoined order, as soon as is practically possible for reasons offered below, vacating in its entirety the April 9, 2013 Order, entitled Findings, Conclusion and Order re Contempt of the Court's November 7, 2012 Order.

The parties stipulate to the Court that the underlying employment conditions at issue in these contempt proceedings have been rendered moot due to a substantial change in circumstances, and that vacating the order of April 9, 2013 as a condition of settlement is just and equitable. Furthermore, granting this motion will enhance judicial economy by obviating the need for further trial court and appellate proceedings. Therefore, it is proper for this Court to grant relief from judgment pursuant to TTC § 2.10.170(3)(f) (authorizing the Court to grant relief from judgment for "[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment").

II. Immediate Relief Requested. In light of (1) the Tribes' pending appeals of the November 7, 2012 and April 9, 2013 Orders in this matter, and (2) a Court of Appeals stay that was jointly obtained by the parties, which stay the parties have jointly requested be extended in part to make this request of this Court for global settlement purposes, the parties request that the Court rule on this motion as soon as is practically possible, ideally no later than Monday, May 13, 2013, as the Court of Appeals has extended its stay only until May 17, 2013.

JOINT MOTION TO VACATE - 2

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1	Dated this 2nd day of May, 2013.
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3	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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5	OFFICE OF RESERVATION ATTORNEY
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7	Lion m Vandeynd-Anderson
8	Tigo M Vandouford Andrews Bossestin Att. WODAN COGOC
9	Lisa M. Vanderford-Anderson, Reservation Attorney, WSBA No. 29736 Representing Tulalip Tribes
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13	GALANDA BROADMAN
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15	Lion m Vandeyord-Anderson, for
16	Gabriel Galanda, Attorney representing T.S.
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JOINT MOTION TO VACATE - 3

ORDER

This matter having come before this Court on a Joint Motion to Vacate the April 9, 2013 Findings, Conclusion and Order re Contempt of the Court's November 7, 2012 Order. The court finds there is good cause to VACATE the April 9, 2013 Order Findings, Conclusion and Order re Contempt of the Court's November 7, 2012 Order. Therefore it is hereby Ordered that the April 9, 2013 Findings, Conclusion and Order re Contempt of the Court's November 7, 2012 Order is VACATED and shall be expunged from the above-referenced court file(s) and records immediately.

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Dated this Zuday of May, 2013.

Tulalip Tribal Court Judge Savel A. Brown, Poten

JOINT MOTION TO VACATE - 4