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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

SHERRI BLACK,)	
)	Case No. C13-5415-RBL
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	SUQUAMISH TRIBE RESPONSE TO
vs.)	UNITED STATES MOTION TO
)	DISMISS
)	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,)	Noted for Consideration:
)	September 13, 2013
Defendants.)	

Introduction

The United States has moved to dismiss the BIA, DOI and the United States from this action, setting forth essentially one reason: that the only claims Plaintiff asserts in this action are intentional or constitutional torts, and that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for claims based upon the intentional torts

1 asserted in this action. The Suquamish Tribe, however, contends the Plaintiff has alleged claims
2 that appear to be based on simple negligence, and not upon intentional torts among a significant
3 number of constitutional and intentional tort claims.

4 In addition, the Plaintiff has named over twenty “John Doe” defendants, who may or may
5 not be federal employees as defined under 25 USC §450 *et seq.* (Indian Self Determination and
6 Education Assistance Act as amended by Pub. L. 101–512, Title III, §314, Nov. 5, 1990, 104
7 Stat. 1959, as amended by Pub. L. 103–138, Title III, §308, Nov. 11, 1993, 107 Stat. 1416)
8 (ISDEA) depending on whether the named John Does are Tribal or non-tribal actors. The United
9 States is obliged to remain in this litigation until it is clear whether or not additional Tribal
10 officers will be named.

11
12 Further, the United States is incorrect in its interpretation of the nature of the law
13 enforcement activities contracted under the (“ISDEA”), 25 USC §450 *et seq.* Contrary to the
14 United States’ position, alleged intentional torts do in fact subject the United States to an
15 obligation to defend under the FTCA.
16

17 Arguments

18 **I. Plaintiff Is Advancing Simple Negligence Claims besides Intentional Tort Claims**

19 It is not clear from the allegations in the Complaint that all claims brought by the Plaintiff
20 are in the nature of intentional torts. Indeed, some of the allegations appear to be based in
21 negligence rather than intent. For example, the Plaintiff’s Complaint at Paragraph 9.3 alleges,
22 “Defendant’s [sic] committed a negligent or wrongful act or omission.” According to the
23 Plaintiff’s allegations, the failure of officers at the scene to call for and provide emergency
24 medical services could, if all elements were proven, provide a factual basis for a negligence
25 claim. The United States admits that it is responsible for defending tribal officers haled into
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1 court on simple negligence claims. *See* United States Motion to Dismiss at 3-4. It is simply too
2 early in this proceeding to dismiss the United States while potential negligence claims have been
3 asserted in the complaint. For this reason, the Court should deny the United States Motion.

4 **II. Any Tribal John Doe Defendants Are Entitled to the Same FTCA Defense as the**
5 **Named Tribal Defendants**

6 The United States is obligated to defend not only the one Tribal actor identified in the
7 pleadings by name, but also any Tribal “John Does” set out in the Complaint who are yet to be
8 named and who are alleged to have committed acts of simple negligence. Because the United
9 States has an obligation to certify when a tribal officer is acting as a federal employee within the
10 scope of his or her duties under the FTCA, as it did with Officer Graves of the Port Gamble
11 S’Klallam Tribe, it is unclear how the remaining unnamed Tribal law enforcement officers (if
12 any) who were at the scene will be certified, protected or defended by the United States if the
13 United States Motion to Dismiss is granted. For this reason, the Court should deny the United
14 States Motion.
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16 **III. Contracting or Compacting Law Enforcement Services with the Federal**
17 **Government Pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance**
18 **Act Provides Tribes with Independent Authority to Enforce Federal Law**

19 The ISDEA (commonly referred to in Indian Country as “638” after its Public Law
20 Number, P.L. 93-638) provides Tribes with the ability to contract programs, functions, services
21 and activities from the federal government. At least in part, the goal of the Act was to end
22 federal paternalism in the operation of on-reservation programs by giving Tribes the opportunity
23 to operate and redesign (as needed, and subject to federal approval) these programs in ways best
24 suited to address tribal needs. ISDEA includes several different types of agreements – contracts,
25 grants-in-lieu-of-a-contract, and self-governance compacts. Regardless of the agreement type,
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1 the Tribe receives federal funding to take over a program, function, service, or activity of the
2 federal government. *See*, Thomas W. Christie, *An Introduction to the Federal Tort Claims Act In*
3 *Indian Self Determination Act Contracting*, 71 Mont. L. Rev. 115 (2010).

4 In the case of the Suquamish Tribe, it has a self-governance compact that includes law
5 enforcement as one of the contracted programs, functions, services or activities. It has operated a
6 contracted law enforcement program for over thirty years. In delivering these law enforcement
7 services, first under an ISDEA contract and more recently under the compact, the Suquamish
8 Tribe has received funding of an equivalent amount that the Department of the Interior would
9 have spent (along with certain adjustments) on those services for the Tribe. *See* 25 USC §450
10 j-1.
11

12 It is important to note that the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, is
13 charged with “enforcement of Federal law and, with the consent of the Indian tribe, tribal law.”
14 25 USC §2802(c). And logically, the only organic law enforcement activities in which the BIA
15 can engage are *federal* law enforcement activities, because in order to enforce either state law or
16 tribal law, it must have some type of permission to do so. *Id.* Consequently, when the
17 Suquamish Tribe contracted the BIA program, the only law enforcement activity that could be
18 contracted is *federal* law enforcement.¹
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21 The United States attempts to argue that a “special law enforcement commission” (SLEC)
22 is required before a tribal police officer can be considered a “Federal law enforcement officer.”
23

24 1 25 USC §2804 mandates the Secretary of the Interior to develop minimum standards (in consultation with
25 Tribes) for the “special law enforcement commissioning agreements.” However, this is duplicative of the existing
26 contracting or compacting process under ISDEA, as the Tribe and Secretary of the Interior negotiate the standards
27 that apply to the performance of the program, service, function, or activity to be contracted or compacted
28 by the particular Tribe. *See, e.g.* 25 USC §2802(e) which gives the Secretary of the Interior broad authority to set
law enforcement training requirements.

1 However, there is no requirement that ISDEA contracted officers have an SLEC. 25 USC §2804
2 merely notes that the SLEC is a reflection of the status of that particular individual as one who
3 *can* carry out federal law enforcement. If one is already capable of performing federal law
4 enforcement duties (for example, a United States Marshall, an Agent of the Federal Bureau of
5 Investigation, or a Tribal law enforcement officer, trained and meeting the standards of the
6 Tribal-Department of the Interior compact or ISDEA contract), no additional authorization
7 through the SLEC is or should be required.
8

9 The United States has outlined a number of cases from several other jurisdictions that
10 generally require that before a tribal law enforcement officer can be considered a federal law
11 enforcement officer, that person *must* have an SLEC, citing *Dry v. United States*, 235 F.3d 1249
12 (10th Cir. 2000); *Locke v. United States*, 215 F.Supp.2d 1033 (D.S.D. 2002), *aff'd*, *Locke v.*
13 *United States*, 63 Fed.Appx. 971 (8th Cir. 2003); *Trujillo v. United States*, 313 F.Supp.2d 1146
14 (D.N.M. 2003); *Vallo v. United States*, 298 F.Supp.2d 1231 (D.N.M. 2003). Admittedly, there
15 are many courts that have determined that a SLEC is required before a law enforcement officer is
16 considered a “federal” law enforcement officer. However, the courts’ holdings in these cases are
17 not on point. The question of what an ISDEA contracting or compacting tribe had contracted *if*
18 *not federal law enforcement* was not before the courts. Absent separate authorization by Tribal
19 government, the BIA law enforcement program cannot enforce tribal law. Similarly, absent
20 some state authorization, the BIA law enforcement program cannot enforce state law. Simple
21 logic then demonstrates that the only law enforcement activities that can be contracted by a Tribe
22 under an ISDEA contract or compact *must* be *federal* law enforcement.
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1 While there is no case law which squarely addresses the question of exactly what is
 2 contracted when a tribe contracts law enforcement from the United States under ISDEA, a very
 3 recent Ninth Circuit case examined the application and contracting process under the ISDEA
 4 where there was no existing law enforcement program. *Los Coyotes Band Of Cahuilla &*
 5 *Cupeño Indians v. Jewell, et al.*, No. 11-57222 D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01448-AJB-NLS, Slip Op.
 6 (September 4, 2013). In *Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeño Indians*, the Ninth Circuit held
 7 that because the BIA had had no law enforcement program, there was no program, function,
 8 service or activity for the Tribe to take over; therefore, there was no federal funding to transfer to
 9 the Tribe. As the Ninth Circuit noted:

11 The ISDA allows the Tribe to take control of existing programs and obtain the
 12 funds that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) would otherwise have spent on
 13 those programs. Where there is no existing BIA program, there is nothing that the
 14 BIA would have spent on the program, and therefore nothing to transfer to the
 15 Tribe.

16 *Id. at 4.*

17 If the BIA has contracted a law enforcement program to a Tribe, it must be an *existing*
 18 program. Since the BIA on its own does not have the jurisdiction to enforce either state or Tribal
 19 law, then it *must* be enforcing federal law, since it is the only law enforcement program it can
 20 contract to a Tribe.

21 **IV. Tribal Law Enforcement Officers and Law Enforcement Programs Meet Identical**
 22 **or More Restrictive Standards than Those Required for a SLEC**

23 Contrary to the intent of Congress, the United States' reliance on the SLEC is a
 24 particularly disingenuous means of shifting responsibility for *Bivens*-type tort claims away from
 25 the United States. One needs only look at the regulations for the BIA law enforcement program
 26 to realize that there are virtually no differences in the training, education, performance standards,

1 and even pay rates between BIA law enforcement programs and tribally contracted law
2 enforcement programs. Notwithstanding its chilling effect on tribal creativity and initiative in
3 designing programs to meet specific tribal needs, the BIA admits that it will impose minimum
4 standards on tribal programs, stating:

5
6 [T]he Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs will ensure minimum standards are
7 maintained in high risk activities where the Federal government retains liability
8 and the responsibility for settling tort claims arising from contracted law
9 enforcement programs. It is not fair to law abiding citizens of Indian country to
10 have anything less than a professional law enforcement program in their
11 community. Indian country law enforcement programs that receive Federal
12 funding and/or commissioning will be subject to a periodic inspection or
13 evaluation to provide technical assistance, to ensure compliance with minimum
14 Federal standards, and to identify necessary changes or improvements to BIA
15 policies.

16 25 CFR §12.12. (*emphasis added*).

17 Despite the United States' position in its Motion to Dismiss, this policy statement
18 published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs makes clear that the purpose of these standards are
19 precisely designed to address the facts of this case – to provide the appropriate training and
20 professionalism to safeguard the public and to acknowledge that the Federal government retains
21 liability for tort claims arising from those contracted programs. It is also clear from this policy
22 statement that the BIA anticipated that such liability could result from either the funding of
23 programs in a contracting situation or from the act of commissioning with or without contracting
24 under the ISDEA.

25 Because of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' regulations, for all practical purposes there is
26 virtually no difference between a tribal police law enforcement program and the BIA law
27 enforcement program or any program under the SLEC rubric. BIA regulations require that
28 "Every Indian country law enforcement program covered by the regulations in this part must

1 maintain an effective and efficient law enforcement program meeting minimal qualitative
2 standards and procedures specified in chapter 68 Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual (BIAM) and
3 the Law Enforcement Handbook.” 25 CFR §12.14.

4 Of particular note to this case, the BIA regulations also require that:

5 The Director will develop and maintain the use of force policy for all BIA law
6 enforcement personnel, and for programs receiving BIA funding or authority.
7 Training in the use of force, to include non-lethal measures, will be provided
8 annually. All officers will successfully complete a course of instruction in
9 firearms, to include judgment pistol shooting, approved by the Indian Police
10 Academy before carrying a firearm on or off duty.

11 25 CFR §12.55.

12 Here, the United States shirks its responsibilities to the Tribe(s) as promised by Congress
13 in the ISDEA and its subsequent amendments by hiding behind the SLEC argument to avoid
14 liability for tort claims that the United States would otherwise defend were the officers equally
15 trained but from any other federal law enforcement agency.

16 **V. A Special Law Enforcement Commission Is Practically Unavailable in Indian
17 Country In Western Washington**

18 In its Motion to Dismiss, the United States places great reliance on the existence of the
19 SLEC as evidence of the sole means for tribes to enforce *federal* law in Indian Country, and
20 argues that the only way that a Tribal law enforcement officer can ever enforce federal law is
21 with an SLEC. That is not the case here. Tribal law enforcement officers routinely work with
22 the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other purely federal law enforcement agencies and
23 routinely refer cases to the United States Attorney for prosecution. Under the United States’
24 position, however, tribal law enforcement officers enforce federal law at great risk, as the SLEC
25 is virtually unavailable in Western Washington. *See*, Affidavit of Mike Lasnier. Regardless,
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1 obstacles to gaining SLEC deputation exist and have only grown more so in recent years. *See*
2 *e.g.*, BIA Interim Policy 4-04-01. Despite several attempts by the Suquamish Tribe to obtain
3 SLEC deputation, even going so far as to pay for specific training on this matter and to bring
4 trainers in from great distances, the Suquamish Tribe has been frustrated in its efforts to receive
5 SLEC certification. *See*
6 <http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc012192.pdf> (Statement of
7 Mike Lasnier, pages 162-175, United States Department Of The Interior, Bureau Of Indian
8 Affairs Tribal Law And Order Act Consultation, October 20, 2010, Albuquerque, New Mexico)
9 (hereinafter “Statement”). There appear to be few, if any, tribal law enforcement officers in
10 Washington State who also have a Special Law Enforcement Commission unless they are part of
11 an intergovernmental task force of some kind, because of the changes in the law required by the
12 recent Tribal Law and Order Act, the difficulties in obtaining the training required, and even
13 reaching agreement on the certification process. *See* Statement at pages 164-170. Thus, the
14 Affidavit of SAC Woolworth, attached to the United States Motion to Dismiss creates a false
15 impression that there is a clear path to a SLEC in Washington when in fact the United States has
16 issued a mere handful of SLECs despite repeated attempts by Washington Tribes to acquire
17 SLECs for their Officers. *Id.*

21 **VI. Federal Statutory Law Does Not Necessarily Require a Special Law Enforcement** 22 **Commission to Enforce Federal Law**

23 Although the United States points to 25 USC §2804(b) to suggest that a separate
24 agreement is required before commissioning can occur, the statute shows it does not require it.
25 The first subsection of §2804(b) requires that the Secretary establish the minimum requirements
26 to be included in the SLEC agreements. However, the actual policy guidance developed by the

1 BIA explains in detail that these agreements are only “to be issued or renewed at BIA-OJS
2 discretion and only when legitimate law enforcement need requires issuance.” BIA Interim
3 Policy 4-04-01(C). The policy then goes into great detail about the training and qualification
4 requirements imposed before a person can receive a SLEC – requirements that are all already
5 imposed through the regulations in 25 CFR Part 12 on Tribes contracting and receiving funding
6 under the ISDA to perform federal law enforcement activities.
7

8 One reason for these requirements that makes much more sense and fulfills a logical law
9 enforcement purpose for the existence of 25 USC §2804 and this SLEC policy is to allow the
10 BIA and/or contracted Tribes to get assistance from other tribes (which do not contract Federal
11 law enforcement services) and state and local law enforcement agencies in order to address short-
12 term task force and similar situations where additional law enforcement resources are needed in
13 Indian Country or elsewhere. *See* BIA Interim Policy 4-04-01(E). Inter-Tribal task forces are
14 quite common in Indian country. For example, the Suquamish Tribal Police have expertise in
15 tracking, finding, and uncovering hidden drug labs and marijuana grows in remote locations and
16 are often asked to work on other Indian reservations in drug interdiction activities because of it.
17 *See* Aff. Lasnier. While performing such activity on the Suquamish Reservation clearly falls
18 within the Suquamish Police Department’s contracted authority, a SLEC would be a highly
19 useful commission to have for Suquamish Officers performing these activities on another
20 Reservation.
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23 Therefore, contrary to the United States’ urging, there is another equally valid purpose for
24 SLECs issued under 25 USC §2804 that has nothing to do with requiring the officers of
25 contracting tribes to obtain same in order to enforce federal law on their own Reservation, or to
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1 have same in order to be considered federal law enforcement officers for purposes of the
2 intentional tort claim exception to the FTCA.

3 **VII. The Underlying Goal of the ISDEA Is to Give Tribes the Same Benefits and**
4 **Advantages of Federal Programs, including the Complete Benefit of the Federal**
5 **Tort Claims Act**

6 The whole history of the ISDEA shows that it was designed to give Tribes at the least, the
7 same resources to perform the various programs, functions, services or activities that had been
8 performed by the Department of the Interior or the Indian Health Services before the Tribe
9 contracted the activity. *See* 25 USC §450f. Although tribes are generally encouraged to be
10 creative in making these programs, functions, services or activities meet tribal needs, Congress
11 clearly wanted tribes to have the same advantages and opportunities that the Federal government
12 had when undertaking the contracted program, function, service or activity. Throughout the
13 ISDEA, Congress made provisions for contracting or compacting tribes to receive a wide range
14 of access – property transfers for those resources used by the federal program, access to GSA
15 sources of supply, access to surplus property, inclusion of tribal property in a regular *federal*
16 replacement schedule, as well as the opportunity for direct hires from the federal government to
17 continue receiving *federal* unemployment, retirement, health and other benefits while working
18 for the tribe that has assumed responsibility for the operation of any formerly federal program,
19 function, service or activity. *See generally* 25 USC §450j and §450i. The United States’ theory
20 of how the SLEC works is self-serving and runs contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed
21 in the ISDEA and the Tribal Law Enforcement Act.
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25 Tribal law enforcement officers who meet the standards to be employed by the tribe when
26 contracting or compacting federal law enforcement programs must be treated as federal

1 employees for *all* federal tort claims purposes. Any remaining policy or regulatory provision to
2 the contrary must fail of necessity, because tribal law enforcement personnel contract to perform
3 and actually do perform federal law enforcement. Further, the United States fails to cite to any
4 authority that Congress intended to provide disparate treatment to federal and tribal law
5 enforcement officers given virtually identical training, standards, ethics, policies and procedures
6 between those used by the BIA and those *imposed* by the BIA on Tribes.
7

8 **Conclusion**

9 The Plaintiff has expressed at least some allegations in her Complaint which sound in
10 negligence, such as the allegation that the police failed to provide medical assistance to Mr.
11 Black if all elements are proven at trial. Further, notwithstanding case law to the contrary, the
12 Suquamish Tribe has contracted with and continues to contract with the federal government to
13 provide law enforcement services on the Port Madison Indian Reservation and those officers who
14 fulfill the standards set forth in the ISDEA contract or compact are contracted first to enforce
15 *federal* law and second to enforce tribal law. For all the above reasons, the Suquamish Tribe
16 respectfully requests this Court to deny the United States Motion to Dismiss.
17
18

19 The Suquamish Tribe

20 DATED this 9th day of September, 2013.
21

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 9, 2013, I caused the foregoing document to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the District Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of this filing to all parties registered for this matter with the CM/ECF system.

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